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ABSTRACT

WHY DOES MINDFULNESS REDUCE AGGRESSION?
EXPLORING THE ROLE OF RESPONSE INHIBITION

Kristen Thompson, Ph.D.
Department of Psychology
Northern Illinois University, 2016
Alan Rosenbaum, Director

Mindfulness-based interventions are increasingly being used to reduce aggressive
behavior; however, the mechanisms through which increases in mindfulness are associated
with reductions in aggression are not well understood. Based on research suggesting that
mindfulness-induced alterations to inhibitory control might be a potential mechanism for this
effect, the present study evaluated whether a single, brief mindfulness induction would have
immediate, state-based effects on aggressive behavior and whether, if present, such effects
would be partially explained by mindfulness-induced changes to inhibitory control. A
focused breathing exercise was used to induce mindfulness in a sample of aggressive,
mindfulness-naïve, male undergraduates whose performances on the Stroop task and Taylor
Aggression Paradigm were then compared to that of a control group (N = 65). No significant
between-groups differences in TAP performance or Stroop interference scores were detected,
and response inhibition was not a significant predictor of aggressive behavior. Results
suggest that the previously identified effects of mindfulness on inhibitory control and

aggressive behavior may not be present after a single mindfulness induction. Problems with
operationalizing and assessing mindfulness are discussed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Mindfulness, commonly defined as the practice of cultivating non-judgmental,
present-focused attention (Kabat-Zinn, 1994), is a rapidly growing area of research in the
psychological sciences that has seen widespread application to various psychological
constructs and interventions (e.g., Brown & Ryan, 2003; Kabat-Zinn, 1990). Applied to the
study of aggression, research has demonstrated that individuals high in trait mindfulness are
less likely to behave aggressively. Further, studies have linked mindfulness training with
reductions in aggressive behavior (Heppner et al., 2008; Samuelson, Carmody, Kabat-Zinn, &
Bratt, 2007). As a result, mindfulness-based interventions have become increasingly common
components of treatments for aggressive behavior (Fix & Fix, 2013). In order to utilize
mindfulness-based treatments most effectively, it is important to more fully understand how
mindfulness impacts one’s propensity for aggression. However, little is currently known about
the mechanisms through which this relationship operates.
Among the many proposed mechanisms of the relationship between mindfulness and
aggression are elements of executive functioning, including response inhibition, which may
be particularly influential in this relationship. Theoretically, aggressive behavior has often
been characterized by problems with response inhibition (Berkowitz, 2008), and research has
demonstrated that individuals who exhibit deficits in response inhibition are more likely to
engage in aggressive behavior (Cohen et al., 2003). In contrast, a positive relationship has
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been found between mindfulness and response inhibition, such that greater mindfulness is
associated with better inhibitory control (Chan & Woollacott, 2007; Moore & Malinowski,
2009). Moreover, mindfulness-based treatments have been shown to increase participants’
capacity for response inhibition (Friese, Messner, & Schaffner, 2012; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).
Taken together, these findings suggest that response inhibition may account, in part, for the
association between mindfulness and reductions in aggressive behavior.
While research has linked deficits in response inhibition to aggression, studies that
have identified this relationship have been correlational, not causal, in nature. For example,
existing studies have demonstrated that violent individuals perform more poorly on
assessments of response inhibition compared to non-violent controls (e.g., Cohen et al., 2003).
However, available studies have not directly assessed response inhibition prior to or during
provocation and aggressive responding. Accordingly, it cannot be determined whether
decreased response inhibition in the context of provocation contributes directly to the
likelihood for aggressive responding. Thus, studies that evaluate the impact of variations in
response inhibition on aggressive behavior are needed in order to establish the relationship
between response inhibition and aggression as causal in nature.
Studies of this kind have been conducted to verify the nature of the relationship
between mindfulness and response inhibition and have provided causal evidence that
improvements in mindfulness increase inhibitory control (Heeren, Van Broeck, & Philippot,
2009; Tang et al., 2007). However, available research has not yet determined the amount of
mindfulness training necessary to generate such improvement. As most of the available
research on the association between mindfulness and response inhibition has been conducted
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in the context of mindfulness-based interventions, post-test assessments of inhibitory control
have typically occurred after participants have had repeated opportunities to learn and practice
mindfulness techniques (e.g., Heeren et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). As
a result, these studies suggest that training in mindfulness might alter response inhibition
through repeated practice. However, given that available research does not assess inhibitory
control immediately following participants’ first exposure to mindfulness, it cannot be
determined whether mindfulness has more immediate, state-based effects on response
inhibition. Such assessments are necessary in order to determine whether improved inhibitory
control is more characteristic of being in a mindful state, regardless of the amount of
mindfulness training that has occurred. If this were the case, then changes in inhibitory
control would be expected to be present following a single successful induction of
mindfulness, as opposed to only arising after extensive training in mindfulness techniques.
Given the associations between both response inhibition and mindfulness and response
inhibition and aggressive behavior, the present study aimed to determine whether
improvements to inhibitory control might partially explain why mindfulness-based treatments
have been successful at reducing aggressive behavior. Additionally, the present study
evaluated the extent to which a single mindfulness induction influenced the effect of
mindfulness on response inhibition. Finally, this study used an experimental design to
manipulate response inhibition prior to assessments of aggressive behavior in order to
determine whether participants’ capacity for inhibitory control is causally associated with
their propensity for aggression.

4
Mindfulness

Mindfulness Defined

The concept of mindfulness is derived from the Buddhist contemplative tradition of
mindful meditation, known as sattipatana vipassana (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). In the Buddhist
tradition, mindful meditation is characterized by sustained attention to the ongoing flow of
experiences, including any thoughts, emotions, or sensations that arise, without exercising
judgment or interpretation toward them (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). Mindfulness has variably been
defined as “paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment, and
nonjudgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn, 1994, p. 4); “bringing one’s complete attention to the present
experience on a moment-to-moment basis” (Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999, p. 68); “an enhanced
attention to and awareness of current experience or present reality” (Brown & Ryan, 2003, p.
822); and “the nonjudgmental observation of the ongoing stream of internal and external
stimuli as they arise” (Baer, 2003, p. 125). Consistently across definitions, attention and
awareness are seen as key components of mindfulness. Awareness is the constant monitoring
of one’s internal and external experience, whereas attention is a more focused awareness on a
specific aspect of experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003). As described by Brown and Ryan
(2003), attention and awareness work in tandem such that attention continuously identifies
“figures” from the “ground” of awareness, which attention then holds in focus for varying
lengths of time. When one is mindful, focused attention is momentarily placed on each
experience in awareness as it arises and then is released in order to attend to the next element
of experience. For example, one might be generally aware of the sensations of breathing while
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attending specifically to the separate elements of experience it includes, such as the rise and
fall of the chest, the sound of air moving through the nose, and the change in temperature of
the air from inhalation to exhalation. At the same time, one would also be aware (and briefly
attentive to) other experiences, including thoughts, emotions, other physical sensations, and
stimuli from the environment. By dynamically directing attention in this way, rumination,
absorption in the past or present, and judgment of the present experience are limited (Brown
& Ryan, 2003). When these behaviors arise, they are simply noted as a component of the
current experience, rather than engaged with cognitively.
Bishop and colleagues (2004) convened in an effort to propose an operational
definition of mindfulness that is distinct from its spiritual roots and that can be used to
facilitate more precision in research of its etiologies and outcomes. They identified a twocomponent model of mindfulness which includes 1) the self-regulation of attention toward the
experience of the present moment and 2) a purposeful attitude of curiosity, openness, and
acceptance toward present-moment experiences. Defined this way, mindfulness includes both
a behavioral (focused attention) and attitudinal (non-judgment) component.
Mindfulness has alternately been conceptualized as both 1) a state of being or mode of
awareness (i.e., nonjudgmental attention and awareness in the present moment; Bishop et al.,
2004) and 2) a trait or general disposition (i.e., “the greater tendency to abide in mindful states
over time”; Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, p. 218). However, in outlining their
conceptualization of mindfulness, Bishop and colleagues (2004) argue that there may be traitlike differences in the frequency with which mindfulness is invoked, both dispositionally and
as a result of training, but that mindfulness itself remains an active process to be engaged in (a
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state), rather than a fixed characteristic of one’s personality (a trait). They contend that
mindfulness is a psychological process or way of acting, which must be actively engaged
through focused self-regulation of attention and cultivation of openness and acceptance of
experience. Thus, when one’s experiences are actively approached in this manner, one is
mindful, whereas when this approach is not taken, mindfulness ceases.
Mindfulness is typically cultivated from an occasionally experienced state to a more
widespread approach to experience through the practice of mindful meditation (Samuelson et
al., 2007). Mindful meditation typically consists of first focusing attention on one component
of experience (e.g., monitoring one’s breathing) until attention is reasonably sustained and
then gradually expanding the field of awareness until ultimately all internal and external
components of experience are attended to as they occur (Kabat-Zinn, 1982). However,
mindfulness training is not limited to traditional sitting meditation techniques. The extant
literature includes numerous examples of mindfulness exercises, both highly structured (e.g.,
mindful raisin eating; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and unstructured (e.g., following your breath; KabatZinn, 1990). Exercises may cultivate focused, concentrative attention on internal experiences
(e.g., thoughts, emotions, breath) or external experiences (e.g., sights, sounds, or smells in the
environment), or they may foster a more receptive, open awareness of the broader field of
experiences as they arise in the present moment (e.g., observing and noting experiences as
they occur). Across exercises, however, the goal remains the same: to observe experiences of
the present moment without judgment (Baer, 2003).
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Mindfulness Associations and Applications

Mindfulness has been repeatedly identified as a predictor of overall psychological
well-being, as well as a protective factor against psychopathology and other adverse outcomes
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). For instance, higher levels of mindful attention and awareness have
been associated with a number of measures of well-being, including increased positive affect,
life satisfaction and self-esteem, and decreased depression, angry hostility, and impulsivity
(Brown & Ryan, 2003). As a result, it has seen widespread application in the field of
psychology, particularly as an intervention tool in a variety of well-supported treatments,
including Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (MSBR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Dialectical
Behavioral Therapy (Linehan, 1993), and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). Mindfulness has been used for the treatment of chronic pain
(Chiesa & Serretti, 2011), anxiety (Kabat-Zinn et al., 1992), depression (Segal, Williams, &
Teasdale, 2002), substance abuse (Marlatt & Gordon, 1985), trauma (Follette, Palm, &
Pearson, 2006), and binge eating (Kristeller & Hallett, 1999), to name a few. Constructs such
as anger, aggression, and hostility have also been empirically evaluated both for associations
with mindfulness and as targets for mindfulness-based interventions, and each of these has
been found to decrease following mindfulness-based interventions (e.g., Fix & Fix, 2013;
Samuelson et al., 2007).

Mindfulness and Aggression

Mindfulness-based treatments focus on non-judgmental acceptance and calm,
deliberate behavior, making them obvious targets for exploration in the treatment of
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aggressive behavior. Mindfulness is associated with greater self-regulation of emotion and
behavior (Brown & Ryan, 2003) and therefore might be useful for the regulation of anger and
aggressive behavior more specifically. Further, being mindful may allow us to experience
threatening information about ourselves in a less defensive, more accepting away, thus
lessening the impetus for an aggressive response (Gallagher, Hudepohl, & Parrott, 2010).
Mindfulness calls for the acceptance of emotional experiences without immediately
attempting to avoid or act on them. Accordingly, Wright, Day, and Howells (2009) argue that
mindfulness training may facilitate increased tolerance of anger and provide opportunities for
exposure to anger without action, which may ultimately extinguish otherwise dominant
aggressive reactions. Finally, mindfulness is thought to further reduce reflexive responding by
teaching individuals to become less fused with emotional experiences, allowing for responses
to experiences that are more flexible and less automatic, which may ultimately result in
reductions in aggressive behavior (Wupperman et al., 2012). While the mechanisms through
which mindfulness decreases aggression are yet unclear, trait mindfulness (i.e., one’s
tendency to experience mindful states) has repeatedly shown an inverse relationship with
aggressive behavior (e.g., Heppner et al., 2008; Kelley & Lambert, 2012), and the profusion
of treatments that have successfully applied mindfulness-based techniques to the reduction of
anger and aggressive behavior suggest that it is a promising treatment approach that warrants
further exploration and dismantling of its effects (e.g., Fix & Fix, 2013; Samuelson et al.,
2007).
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Dispositional Mindfulness and Associations with Aggression

Associations between increased dispositional (trait) mindfulness and decreased
aggression have been repeatedly demonstrated across a variety of samples (e.g., Borders,
Earleywine, & Jajodia, 2010; Heppner et al., 2008; Kelley & Lambert, 2012). In a student
sample, Heppner and colleagues (2008) found that higher self-reported mindfulness was
associated with decreased verbal aggression, hostility, anger, and total aggressiveness as
reported on the Aggression Questionnaire (AQ; Buss & Perry, 1992); however, mindfulness
was unrelated to the physical aggression subscale of the AQ. In contrast, Borders and
colleagues (2010) found that higher rates of physical and verbal aggression reported on the
AQ were associated with decreased dispositional mindfulness. These results were consistent
across two samples, including college students and members of a mindfulness-based web
community (Borders et al., 2010). Kelley and Lambert (2012) found similar results in a
sample of undergraduate criminal justice students, demonstrating that higher self-reported
trait mindfulness was associated both with decreased physical and verbal aggression as well
as decreased hostility and anger, as reported on the AQ.
Associations with mindfulness have also been found in the context of intimate partner
violence (IPV; e.g., Shorey, Seavey, Quinn, & Cornelius, 2013; Stith & Hamby, 2002;
Thompson, Crouch, & Milner, 2014). In a sample of community adults, Thompson and
colleagues (2014) found that self-reported physical and verbal IPV, as reported on the
Revised Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS2; Straus, Hamby, Boney-McCoy,& Sugarman, 1996),
was inversely associated with dispositional mindfulness. Similarly, Stith and Hamby (2002)
found that increased awareness of physiological signs of anger was associated with decreased
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physical, psychological, and sexual aggression toward one’s intimate partner. While they did
not assess mindfulness directly, awareness of one’s physiological reactions represents
attention and awareness in the present moment, which is one of the foundations of
mindfulness practice.
Shorey et al. (2013) evaluated associations between mindfulness and dating violence
perpetration in a sample of female undergraduates. Their investigation utilized a multidimensional self-report assessment of mindfulness: the Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ; Baer, Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006). Their results indicated that
higher scores on the mindful non-reactivity and act-with-awareness dimensions were
associated with decreased physical and psychological dating violence. This suggests that
individuals who are able to inhibit initial responses to stimuli and ultimately make conscious
choices, informed by awareness, are less likely to engage in violence toward a dating partner.
Finally, in a community sample of men, Gallagher et al. (2010) evaluated associations
between trait mindful awareness and sexual aggression in the context of alcohol consumption.
They found that trait mindfulness moderated the relationship between greater alcohol
consumption and sexual aggression toward intimate partners such that heavy drinking was
associated with an increase in sexual aggression for individuals low (but not high) in trait
mindfulness. The authors suggested that drinking can decrease the ability to detect cues that
one’s partner does not want to engage in sexual activity and that greater mindfulness might
buffer against this decrease in awareness. It might also be hypothesized that the reason
intoxication is not associated with an increase in sexual aggression among more mindful men
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is that more mindful men also have an increased capacity for inhibitory control, compared
with men who are less mindful.

Reductions in Aggression Following Mindfulness-Based Treatments

Numerous studies have also found reductions in aggression following mindfulnessbased treatments for individuals previously low in dispositional mindfulness or otherwise
unexposed to mindfulness-based practices (e.g., Fix & Fix, 2013; Samuelson et al., 2007). For
instance, in a report of outcomes of MBSR with a sample of inmates, Samuelson and
colleagues (2007) demonstrated that inmates experienced a decrease in total hostility
(including hostile attributions, hostile affect, hostile aggression, aggressive responding [i.e.,
aggressive behavior], cynicism, and social avoidance) following participation in MBSR.
Additionally, Chapman, Hare, Caton, Donalds, McInnis, and Mitchell (2013) reviewed a
series of studies that used mindfulness-based techniques for reducing aggressive behavior
among individuals with intellectual disabilities. The majority of the studies they reviewed
utilized Soles of the Feet (Singh, Wahler, Adkins, & Myers, 2003), a mindfulness-based
meditation program in which individuals are taught to divert their attention away from
emotionally charged stimuli and toward the neutral stimulus of the soles of their feet. Other
interventions in their review included focusing on breathing, thoughts, and neutral stimuli in
the environment (e.g., sounds, clouds). In each of the studies they reviewed, participants’
frequency of physically aggressive episodes decreased following completion of the
mindfulness-based meditation program.
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Fix and Fix (2013) conducted a systematic review of empirical evaluations of the use
of mindfulness to reduce aggressive behaviors, which included Samuelson et al. (2007) and
the studies reviewed by Chapman et al. (2013), as well as interventions with non-intellectually
disabled populations (i.e., undergraduates, inmates, and psychiatric inpatients). Fix and Fix
(2013) identified eleven studies for the review, which they separated based on design: four
group-treatment studies and four individual-treatment studies. Three of the four grouptreatment studies found significant reductions in participant physical aggression, including
significant group differences in two of the three studies that included control groups. Six of
the seven individual treatment studies utilized the Soles of the Feet meditation described
above and found significant reductions in aggressive behavior among young adolescents,
individuals in an inpatient psychiatric hospital, and individuals with a diagnosis of mental
retardation or an autism spectrum disorder. Results for the remaining study, which used a
modified MBSR program to reduce driving anger, found that participants self-reported a
decrease in driving anger; however, decreases in physiological markers of anger (e.g., blood
pressure, pulse) in response to anger-provoking driving-related stimuli were not found. Taken
together, the research reviewed by Fix and Fix (2013) provides support for the use of
mindfulness-based treatments as interventions for aggressive behavior.
Wupperman and colleagues (2012) introduced Mindfulness and Modification Therapy
(MMT) for behavioral dysregulation, a transdiagnostic approach to treating a range of
dysregulated behaviors, including substance abuse and aggression. In their pilot study,
Wupperman et al. (2012) included 14 women who had been court-referred for domestic
violence and alcohol problems. All participants had engaged in at least one act of physical
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violence toward another adult (i.e., their partner or another close friend or family member)
and met criteria for alcohol abuse or dependence. Some of the participants also reported
additional drug use (i.e., cocaine and cannabis). Treatment included 60- to 90-minute weekly
sessions over a period of 12 weeks. The primary goal of MMT was identified as helping
clients “experience and tolerate the present moment” (Wupperman et al., 2012, p. 4),
including times when the present moment includes aversive thoughts and emotions, without
engaging in maladaptive coping behaviors. Essentially, Wupperman and colleagues (2012)
sought to increase participants’ use of mindfulness as a means for coping with distress instead
of responding to their distress in maladaptive ways (e.g., substance abuse and aggression). In
addition to training in mindfulness, treatment included supplemental work in the areas of selfcompassion, communication, and assertiveness. Wupperman et al. (2012) used the Timeline
Follow-Back Assessment Method (Sobell & Sobell, 1996) to track substance use and physical
aggression. Results revealed significant decreases with large effect sizes in both substance use
(i.e., number of days used, amount used) and physical aggression (i.e., number of aggressive
acts) when comparing self-reports during the four weeks prior to treatment to those during the
last four weeks of treatment. Wupperman and colleagues’ (2012) findings are limited by their
lack of a control group and post-treatment follow-up; however, they provide preliminary
support for the use of mindfulness-based treatments for reducing aggressive behavior among
female offenders of domestic violence.
Most of the research on mindfulness interventions for aggression assumes an increase
in trait mindfulness following treatment; however, in the only study of its kind, Heppner and
colleagues (2008) used a mindfulness intervention to evaluate the direct impact of state
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mindfulness on aggressive responding. The authors informed college-student participants that
they would participate in a task either independently or in a group depending on whether other
participants chose to work with them. Participants were instructed to write about themselves
and then were given the self-descriptions of other “participants” to rate. While the ratings
were ostensibly being tallied, participants either participated in a mindfulness induction (e.g.,
raisin eating task; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) or sat alone in a quiet room. As a means of providing
provocation for some of the participants, they then received feedback regarding whether they
had been rated highly by the other participants and assigned to the group condition (accepted),
or they had not been rated highly and would have to work alone (rejected). Participants were
randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 1) accepted, 2) rejected, or 3) rejected +
mindfulness. Finally, participants completed the Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP; Taylor,
1967), a competitive reaction-time task in which participants send and receive noise blasts for
losing a trial. Results indicated that participants in the rejected condition selected significantly
more severe noise blasts to send to their opponents than those in the accepted and mindfully
rejected conditions. Further, the mindfully rejected participants did not differ from the
accepted participants in the severity of the noise blasts they selected. These results suggest
that being mindful may buffer against aggressive responding when provoked. These findings
are also consistent with those of previous studies that demonstrate associations between
increased mindfulness and decreased aggressiveness; however, they are the first to
demonstrate such findings using a mindfulness induction and an empirical design. While
replication of these results is key to establishing their validity, they provide support for the
direct effect of state mindfulness on aggressive responding.
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Mechanisms of Mindfulness

Individuals high in trait mindfulness engage in less aggressive behavior than those low
in trait mindfulness (e.g., Borders et al., 2010; Heppner et al., 2008; Kelley & Lambert, 2012),
and mindfulness-based treatments have shown promise for reducing aggressive behavior (Fix
& Fix, 2013; Heppner et al., 2008; Samuelson et al., 2007; Wupperman et al., 2012);
however, research assessing the processes through which mindfulness and aggression are
connected remain limited. Many potential mechanisms through which mindfulness might
reduce aggressive behavior have been proposed, including (but not limited to) better emotion
regulation, decreased rumination, relaxation (Borders et al., 2010; Wright & Howells, 2009),
de-identification from thoughts, reduced emotional reactivity, enhanced self-monitoring
(Wright & Howells, 2009), improved anger management (Shorey et al., 2013), and lower ego
involvement (Heppner et al., 2008). However, few of these proposed mechanisms have been
evaluated empirically (Borders et al., 2010).
One promising potential mechanism of the association between mindfulness and
aggression is improved executive functioning, particularly in the area of response inhibition
(Borders et al., 2010; Friese, Messner, & Schaffer, 2012). Theoretically and empirically,
mindfulness has been associated with improved inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility
(e.g., Jha, Krompinger, & Baime, 2007; Moore & Malinowski, 2009), whereas aggression has
been found to relate to disinhibition, impulsivity, and deficits in planning and goal-directed
behavior (e.g., Cohen, 2013).
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The Executive Function of Response Inhibition: A Potential Mechanism

Executive Functioning Defined

Executive functioning is typically associated with the functions of the prefrontal
cortex, where executive functioning processes are believed to occur (Stuss & Alexander,
2000; Suchy, 2009). However, definitions of executive functioning and the processes thought
to be subsumed by executive functioning are varied throughout the literature. Executive
functioning has been defined as the ability “to activate...behavioral responses...to maintain
serial order...to monitor and manage basic psychological functions...and to ruminate about
past behaviors and to contemplate future activities” (Benson, 1993, p. 78), to “organize a
behavioral response to solve a complex problem...activation of remote memories, selfdirection and independence from environmental contingencies, shifting and maintaining
behavioral sets appropriately, generating motor programs, and using verbal skills to guide
behavior” (Mega & Cummings, 1994, p. 361), and “a multifaceted neuropsychological
construct consisting of a set of higher-order neuro-cognitive processes that allow higher
organisms to make choices and to engage in purposeful, goal-directed, and future-oriented
behavior” (Suchy, 2009, p. 106). Perhaps most commonly, however, executive functioning
has been defined based on the classic writings of Luria (1966, 1973), who viewed executive
functioning as a collection of higher-order cognitive processes involved in the planning,
initiation, and self-regulation of goal-directed behavior.
Over time, many processes have been put forth as being subsumed under the umbrella
of executive functioning, including, but not limited to, attention, set shifting (i.e., cognitive
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flexibility), planning, organization, hypothesis generation, self- and social monitoring,
response inhibition, abstract reasoning, and working memory (Giancola, 2000; Hoaken,
Giancola, & Pihl, 1998; Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, Howerter, & Wager, 2000;
Stuss & Alexander, 2000). However, there is widespread disagreement regarding what
executive functioning includes, how it is organized (e.g., as a unitary or multi-factored
construct), and which neurological structures are responsible for its actions. Such
disagreements have contributed to the lack of an operational definition or unified
understanding of the roles of executive functioning.
To address these challenges, Miyake and colleagues (2000) used factor analysis to
explore the organization of executive functioning. Their results support the existence of three
distinct but interrelated processes: set shifting/cognitive flexibility, monitoring and updating
working memory, and response inhibition (Miyake et al., 2000). Set shifting or cognitive
flexibility refers to the ability to flexibly shift one’s attention between various components of
experience. Updating/monitoring working memory involves monitoring and coding incoming
information and integrating it with previous information relevant to a given task. Finally,
response inhibition is the ability to intentionally inhibit a prepotent, automatic, and
overlearned response in favor of a less dominant response (Miyake et al., 2000).

Executive Functioning and Mindfulness

The roles of executive functioning in mindfulness practice are inherent in definitions
of mindfulness as a construct. In their two-component model of mindfulness (i.e., sustained
attention to the present moment with an emphasis on acceptance of the present-moment
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experience), Bishop and colleagues (2004) break down the component of present-moment
attention further to include three facets of attention regulation: 1) sustained attention, 2)
attention shifting (i.e., set-shifting), and 3) inhibition of secondary elaborative processing of
experiences as they arise (i.e., response inhibition). Similarly, Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, and
Freedman (2006) proposed that attention in the context of mindfulness requires three types of
attention regulation: 1) sustained concentration, 2) inhibition of secondary processing of
thoughts and feelings (i.e., response inhibition), and 3) flexible switching between
experiences as they arise (i.e., set shifting). In both theories, the executive functions of
response inhibition and set shifting are emphasized. Sustained attention is included in some,
but not all, conceptualizations of executive functioning; however, it can be argued that
sustained attention, which in the context of mindfulness allows for moment-to-moment
awareness, is necessary for facilitating the awareness required to engage in set shifting and
response inhibition. Accordingly, it is crucial to consider the impact mindfulness has on
elements of executive functioning when trying to delineate the mechanisms of its effects.

Response Inhibition

In particular, the executive function of response inhibition may be of special relevance
to the present review and proposed research, as it has important theoretical and empirical
associations with aggressive behavior (Berkowitz, 2008). Response inhibition, or inhibitory
control as it is more broadly described, is an effortful process that requires the deliberate,
conscious inhibition of responses that may otherwise occur automatically. Reading, for
example, becomes highly automatized through overlearning; we often read words we see
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without intending to do so. When completing the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), perhaps the most
commonly used assessment of inhibitory control, participants must intentionally inhibit the
dominant and automatic response of reading in favor of labeling the color of ink in which the
color words are written in (e.g., identify that the word “red” is printed in blue ink, rather than
reading the word). As another example, one engages in response inhibition when the
automatic, prepotent tendency to scratch a rash or mosquito bite is resisted. Inhibiting
scratching is effortful in that one must consciously choose to interrupt the scratching
response, which will bring immediate relief, in favor of making a more goal-oriented choice
of not scratching in the interest of ultimately faster healing.

Response Inhibition and Mindfulness

Bishop and colleagues (2004) argue that mindfulness enhances the self-regulation of
attention, which in turn improves self-regulation of behavior more broadly. This may occur
because the type of attention called for in mindfulness practice requires the ongoing exercise
of response inhibition. When mindful, one repeatedly and deliberately inhibits the automatic
tendency to respond to thoughts by engaging with them cognitively, in favor of simply noting
them and remaining open to the ongoing flow of experience. In this way, response inhibition
is engaged in continually during mindfulness and serves as a key component of mindfulness
practice.
Shapiro and colleagues (2006) further argue that improvements in response inhibition,
cultivated through mindfulness, interfere with the automaticity of our behavior. Mindfulness
training teaches that individuals can identify impulses (e.g., to scratch an itch), choose to
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inhibit automatic responses to them, and, instead, non-judgmentally allow them to be a part of
their experience. In doing so, one recognizes that an impulse is a temporary part of the
present- moment experience that will eventually pass, regardless of whether action is taken.
When awareness of impulses and subsequent non-judgmental acceptance of them is attained,
behavioral responses to impulses are resisted or selected thoughtfully, thus interrupting
automatic behavior and improving the capacity for response inhibition (Ortner & Zelazo,
2012).
In the same way, Ortner and Zelazo (2012) purport that mindfulness may decrease
automatic responding to emotionally evocative stimuli while increasing conscious choice in
behavior selection. For example, a heightened perception of circumstances, thoughts, and
physical sensations facilitated by mindful awareness may serve to alert one to the experience
of anger and facilitate the deliberate selection of a response as opposed to responding
automatically (e.g., in a potentially aggressive manner), thus reducing the likelihood of
impulsive aggression. Empirically, increased mindfulness has repeatedly been associated with
better inhibition on the Stroop task and on similar tasks of inhibition (e.g., Jha et al., 2007;
Moore & Malinowski, 2009), supporting the theoretical argument that mindful moment-tomoment awareness may have a critical effect on the ability to interrupt automatic behavior
patterns and inhibit otherwise dominant responses.

Response Inhibition and Impulsive Aggression

Theoretically, aggressive behavior has been associated with problems with impulsivity
and poor response inhibition (Berkowitz, 2008). This is particularly true for impulsive
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aggression, which is a specific subtype of aggression characterized by deficits in inhibiting
automatic aggressive tendencies in response to provocation. Impulsive aggression is defined
as a reflexive response to a stimulus that results in agitation and an aggressive response; it is
distinguishable from premeditated aggression, which is planned, intentionally enacted, and
goal oriented (Barratt, Stanford, Kent, & Felthous, 1997). Theoretically, difficulties with
response inhibition would primarily be expected to contribute to impulsive aggression
because impulsive aggression results from the failure to inhibit an automatic response to
provocation, whereas premeditated aggression is planned and therefore unrelated to the ability
to inhibit a prepotent response. Berkowitz (2008) goes so far as to argue that most aggressive
behaviors actually occur automatically, thus necessitating a strong capacity for response
inhibition to interrupt such reflexive reactions. Empirically, impulsive aggression, as
compared to premeditated aggression, has been associated with higher trait impulsivity
(Villemarette-Pittman, Stanford, & Greve, 2002), poorer behavioral control (White, Jarrett, &
Ollendick, 2013), and greater problems with response inhibition (Atkins, Stoff, Osborne, &
Brown, 1993; Ellis, Weiss, & Lochman, 2009; Stanford, Greve, & Gerstle, 1997).
Taken together, the associations between mindfulness and response inhibition, as well
as the theoretical support for the role of response inhibition in aggressive behavior, suggest
that response inhibition may be an important mechanism for exploration in understanding
why mindfulness appears to reduce aggressive behavior. It may be that, over time, the use of
response inhibition in the practice of mindfulness improves individuals’ overall capacity to
exercise response inhibition and subsequently decreases behavioral automaticity.
Additionally, mindfulness may facilitate reductions in impulsive responding in a more state-
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based fashion, such that the capacity for response inhibition is further enhanced during
periods of mindfulness because it is intentionally cultivated during mindfulness practice.
These general and state-based improvements to mindfulness would be expected to reduce
aggressive behavior by facilitating individuals’ ability to inhibit automatic, aggressive
responses to provocation in favor of making a more intentional, premeditated response.

Empirical Associations Between Mindfulness and Response Inhibition

Trait Mindfulness and Meditation Experience

Across studies that have evaluated the response inhibition capabilities of meditators
(i.e., those who have a history of practicing mindfulness meditation) and those with high trait
mindfulness, the predominant finding has been that individuals who have more experience
with non-judgmental present-moment awareness are better able to inhibit automatic
responding (Chan & Woollacott, 2007; Jha et al., 2007; Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper &
Inzlicht, 2013; van den Hurk, Giommi, Gielen, Speckens, & Barendregt, 2010). These
findings are clearly evident in outcomes on the Stroop task (e.g., Chan & Woollacott, 2007;
Moore & Malinowski, 2009; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013). For instance, Chan and Woollacott
(2007) presented meditators and non-meditators with a page of Xs presented in different ink
colors (color condition; e.g., Xs variably printed in blue, green, and red), followed by a page
of color words printed in incongruent ink colors (incongruent condition; e.g., the word “blue’”
printed in green ink). For each page, participants were instructed to name the colors of as
many items as they could in 45 seconds. They assessed difficulties with response inhibition
using a Stroop interference score, which was calculated by subtracting the number of color
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items participants labeled from the number of incongruent items they labeled. Their results
revealed that total minutes of daily meditation was negatively correlated with Stroop
interference and positively correlated with the number of items processed during the
incongruent trial (Chan & Woollacott, 2007), suggesting that participants who meditated more
frequently were better able to inhibit the dominant reading response in favor of labeling colors
in the Stroop task, thus demonstrating superior response inhibition compared to nonmeditators.
In another study of meditators and non-meditators, Teper and Inzlicht (2013) showed
that errors committed in the incongruent Stroop condition were negatively correlated with
years of meditation experience and were more common among non-meditators than
meditators; however, these effects were only trending toward significance. In the same study,
however, trait mindfulness as measured by the Philadelphia Mindfulness Scale (PHMS;
Cardaciotto, Herbert, Forman, Moitra, & Farrow, 2008) was significantly negatively
correlated with Stroop errors. Like those of Chan and Woollacott (2007), these results
demonstrate that more mindful individuals exhibit greater inhibitory control, allowing them to
be better able to inhibit automatic responding.
Moore and Malinowski (2009) measured the response inhibition of meditators and
non-meditators using the Stroop task and the D2 test of attention (Brickenkamp & Zilmer,
1998). The D2 test is a timed paper-and-pencil task that requires participants to retain specific
rules regarding which targets to cross out in a field of visually similar distractor targets.
Response inhibition on the D2 test is indexed by errors per items scanned, and scores on the
D2 test have been shown to correlate significantly with performance on the Stroop task
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(Brickenkamp & Zilmer, 1998). Results demonstrated that meditators and those with higher
trait mindfulness, as measured by the Kentucky Inventory of Mindfulness Skills (Baer, Smith,
& Allen, 2004), exhibited better performance on both the Stroop and D2 tests, further
supporting the association between mindfulness and enhanced inhibitory control.
In addition to positive results with the Stroop task, other assessments of inhibitory
control have also revealed response inhibition strengths among meditators and more mindful
individuals (Jha et al., 2007; van den Hurk et al., 2010). Jha and colleagues (2007) compared
the response inhibition of experienced meditators to non-experienced meditators using the
Attention Network Test (ANT; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). The ANT, a
computer-administered assessment, includes a conflict monitoring task in which participants
are required to select a correct response (i.e., whether a target arrow points to the right or left)
in the presence of stimuli that are either congruent (arrows pointing the same direction as the
target) or incongruent (arrows pointing the opposite direction) with the target stimuli. For this
component of the ANT, meditators exhibited superior response inhibition compared to nonmeditators in that they performed significantly better when required to inhibit responding to
the dominant cues (the incongruent arrows) in favor of selecting a less obvious response (the
direction of the target arrow). In a subsequent study, van den Hurk et al. (2010) replicated Jha
and colleagues’ (2007) finding that experienced meditators demonstrate better inhibition of
automatic responses on the conflict monitoring task of the ANT. Van den Hurk and
colleagues (2010) argued that mindful individuals may be better able to inhibit automatic
responding because they are more able to inhibit the shift of attention toward extraneous
external and internal stimuli, which may trigger automatic responses. That is, they suggest
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that it is the improved attentional control fostered by mindful meditation that may allow
mindful individuals to inhibit automatic responding.
It should be noted that not all research has shown significant associations between
mindfulness and response inhibition. Josefsson and Broberg (2011) compared meditators to
student controls who had never meditated and found no differences in inhibitory control, as
measured by the Stroop task. The authors point out, however, that students likely did not
provide a well-matched control group for the meditators. By nature of being college students,
controls may have had better than average executive control. They also were younger and
may have had more computer experience, which could have been advantageous to their
performance on their computer-based administration of the Stroop task.

Effects of Mindfulness Training on Response Inhibition

In addition to evidence suggesting that mindful individuals and meditators
demonstrate improved inhibitory control compared to those who are less mindful (e.g., Chan
& Wollacott, 2007; Jha et al., 2007, Moore & Malinowski, 2009), research has also shown
that mindfulness training can improve elements of executive functioning, including response
inhibition, in both participants experienced in mindfulness practices (Sahdra et al., 2011) and
in those who had not received prior mindfulness training (Friese et al., 2012; Heeren et al.,
2009; Tang et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Sahdra and colleagues (2011) evaluated the
impact of intensive mindfulness training (i.e., a three-month meditation retreat) on response
inhibition among meditators who already had significant meditation experience (i.e., had
previously participated in at least three meditation retreats). Participants completed a
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computerized response inhibition task (RIT; Sahdra et al., 2011) in which they were required
to click their mouse button when a long line appeared on the screen (higher frequency of
presentation) but they were not to respond when a short line (lower frequency) appeared.
Initially, there were no differences on the RIT between meditators selected for the retreat and
those who served as wait-list controls. However, at post-test, only those who participated in
the retreat demonstrated significantly improved RIT performance. Further, results were
maintained at a five-month follow-up. This suggests that, even among very experienced
meditators, additional mindfulness training can precipitate improvements in inhibitory
control.
Heeren et al. (2009) compared the response inhibition of healthy individuals who
participated in eight weeks of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT) to that of
matched controls. Neither group had any prior meditation experience. Participants completed
the Hayling task (Burgess & Shallice, 1996), which assessed their ability to inhibit a prepotent
response. In the Hayling task, participants are required to complete sentences read aloud by
the examiner with either an appropriate word (automatic condition; e.g., “the captain wanted
to stay with the sinking boat”) or inappropriate word (inhibition condition; e.g., “the captain
wanted to stay with the sinking laugh”). Compared to their pre-test scores, at post-test
participants who received MBCT both provided more correct responses and made fewer
errors, whereas those who did not receive MBCT did not significantly improve, suggesting
that mindfulness training improved participants’ ability to inhibit dominant responses.
However, in the same study, there were no pre- to post-test or between-group differences in
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response inhibition as measured by the Trail Making Test (TMT; Reitan, 1958) and a GoStop
task (Dougherty, Mathias, & Marsh, 2003).
While not yet examined extensively, available research has also demonstrated effects
of mindfulness on response inhibition in more brief mindfulness interventions. Tang and
colleagues (2007) randomly assigned students to receive five daily 20-minute training
sessions in either mindfulness or progressive muscle relaxation (PMR) and then assessed
participants’ performance on the conflict monitoring component of the ANT immediately
following the final training session. Their results revealed significant group differences in
post-test inhibitory control such that those who received mindfulness training demonstrated
improved performance on the conflict monitoring component of the ANT, whereas the
conflict monitoring performance of those who learned PMR did not change.
Similarly, Wenk-Sormaz (2005) found decreased Stroop interference among
mindfulness-naïve undergraduates who received two 20-minute mindfulness trainings and a
20-minute mindfulness induction at post-test, compared to controls. Control groups also
participated in practice sessions and the post-test induction: participants in a cognitive control
group used a mnemonic device to learn a list of items, while participants in a resting control
group practiced resting and allowing their mind to wander. The mindfulness group learned to
focus their attention on their breath, without judging themselves when their attention
wandered. Interestingly, the author also controlled for the effect of physiological relaxation.
Using measurements of participants’ galvanic skin response, Wenk-Sormaz (2005) found that
only the mindfulness induction resulted in a reduction in physiological arousal, whereas
participants in both the resting condition and the learning condition experienced an increase in
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arousal. However, arousal did not account for the observed changes in Stroop performance.
Further, bivariate correlations between arousal and Stroop performance were not significant
for any of the groups. These results demonstrate both that mindfulness can impact response
inhibition after a very short period of training and that such changes cannot simply be
attributed to changes in physiological arousal.
Finally, Friese and colleagues (2012) found improved performance on a response
inhibition task following Day 2 of a three-day introduction to meditation seminar (which
heavily emphasized mindfulness-based meditation techniques) and a 5-minute self-directed
mindful meditation, compared to participants who attended the meditation seminar but were
selected to complete a dot-to-dot drawing task instead of meditation. Friese and colleagues’
(2012) results are unique in two ways. First, they provide the only known research that
directly evaluates the state-based effects of mindfulness on response inhibition (i.e., all
participants attended the meditation seminar, but only some meditated prior to the response
inhibition assessment). Second, they assessed participants’ inhibitory control under conditions
of both depleted and non-depleted self-control resources, whereas prior research has typically
been limited to “normal” cognitive conditions. In order to temporarily deplete participants’
capacity for self-control, Friese and colleagues (2012) had participants first watch a series of
disgusting videos and either suppress their emotions by maintaining neutral facial expressions
(suppression condition) or allow themselves to experience their emotions freely (nosuppression condition). Subsequently, participants in the suppression condition either
meditated or completed the drawing task, while all participants in the no-suppression
condition completed the drawing task. Finally, participants’ inhibitory control was measured
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via the D2 test of attention. Results revealed that participants in the suppression plus
meditation condition exhibited better inhibitory control than those in the suppression without
meditation condition, indicating that the response inhibition capacity of those who had
cultivated a mindful state was superior to those who were trained in mindfulness but had not
intentionally induced it. Further, participants in the suppression plus meditation condition
performed as well on the inhibition task as those who were in the no-suppression control
condition, which suggests that mindful meditation may have buffered against the depleting
effects of emotion suppression and allowed mindful participants to retain their normal
capacities for response inhibition. These results are consistent with Heppner et al.’s (2008)
finding that, among participants who were provoked (which would also be expected to deplete
self-control), those who subsequently participated in a mindfulness exercise were less
aggressive than provoked participants who were not mindful. Also like Friese and colleagues’
(2012) findings, those in Heppner and colleagues’ (2008) mindfulness plus provocation group
were no more aggressive than controls who were not provoked at all. Findings from both
studies support the notion that mindfulness preserves inhibitory control in conditions of low
resources and self-control depletion, which may be an instrumental mechanism in the
association between mindfulness and aggression.
As a whole, these findings suggest that inhibitory control can be improved with
mindfulness-based interventions, including those that are very brief (Friese et al., 2012; Tang
et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). However, it must be acknowledged that improvements in
response inhibition have not been found uniformly. Semple (2010) used random assignment
and compared groups of mindfulness-naïve community adults who received mindfulness
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training to both a wait-list control group and an active control group, which received
relaxation training. Active participants were asked to practice either mindfulness or PMR for
20 minutes twice daily over a period of four weeks, and they participated in an induction of
their designated skill prior to post-testing. Expected Stroop practice effects were observed
from pre- to post-tests. However, in contrast to Tang et al.’s (2007) results with a shorter
intervention, there were no between-groups differences in post-test Stroop performance
between mindfulness, PMR, and control participants, indicating that neither mindfulness nor
relaxation training significantly improved participants’ capacity for response inhibition.
Similarly, Anderson, Lau, Segal, and Bishop (2007) found no differences in Stroop
performance in their evaluation of the effects of an eight-week MBSR course. However, it is
noteworthy that, unlike Semple (2010), there were also no significant improvements in
accuracy from pre-test to post-test. The absence of practice effects, which are often observed
in assessments of executive functioning (Bartels, Wegrzyn, Wiedl, Ackermann, & Ehrenreich,
2010), suggests that ceiling effects may have prevented participants in this healthy population
from incurring meaningful change in rsponse inhibition as a result of mindfulness training,
though it should be noted that significant effects of mindfulness have been found in other nonclinical samples (e.g., Jha et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).

Summary and Conclusions

While some findings have been mixed, the majority of research that examines
response inhibition as it relates to mindfulness has shown support for the hypothesis that
training in sustained, non-judgmental attention and awareness can improve the capacity for
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response inhibition and contribute to the deautomatization of overlearned response patterns.
These findings have been demonstrated in comparisons of meditators to controls and in
associations with trait mindfulness (e.g., Chan & Woollacott, 2007; Jha et al., 2007; Moore &
Malinowski, 2009; van den Hurk et al., 2010). Further, results from mindfulness interventions
show that changes in response inhibition can be produced among those previously unexposed
to mindfulness techniques, both following extensive training (Heeren et al., 2009) and brief
interventions (Friese et al., 2012; Tang et al., 2007; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).
Currently, however, no known research has examined whether the induction of a
mindful state can have immediate, state-based effects on response inhibition for mindfulnessnaïve participants. Anderson et al. (2007), Friese et al. (2012), Semple (2010), Tang et al.
(2007), and Wenk-Sormaz (2005) all included a mindfulness induction prior to their
assessment of executive functioning; however, their participants had all learned and practiced
mindfulness techniques prior to response-inhibition assessments. Research on the state-based
effects of first-time mindfulness practice is limited, though, existing studies with mindfulnessnaïve participants have shown state-based effects on participants’ affect (Arch & Craske,
2006; Broderick, 2005; Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Ortner & Zelazo, 2012), ability to decenter (i.e., to view thoughts as mental events rather than reflections of reality; Feldman,
Greeson, & Senville, 2010), decision making (McHugh, Simpson, & Reed, 2010), and
aggressive behavior (Heppner et al., 2008). The finding that is perhaps most related to the
present investigation is that of Hooper, Davies, Davies, and McHugh (2011), who found that a
single mindfulness exercise facilitated less spider avoidance compared to control tasks (i.e.,
thought suppression and unfocused attention) in participants with a fear of spiders. While
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they did not assess response inhibition directly, these results suggest that a single mindfulness
intervention enabled participants to inhibit a dominant response (spider avoidance), thereby
supporting the notion that a mindful state may improve response inhibition abilities, even for
those who are not familiar with mindfulness. However, research that explicitly examines its
impacts during assessments of response inhibition (e.g., the Stroop task) is needed. This type
of research is particularly important in order to determine whether mindfulness has specific
state-based effects on response inhibition, or if the superior response inhibition observed
among those with higher trait mindfulness and mindfulness experience is better attributed to a
more general facilitation of response inhibition which results from repeated mindfulness
practice over time.
Research into the effects of mindfulness on executive functioning has also typically
focused on changes in healthy populations; however, improvements in executive functioning
might also be expected among those with executive functioning deficits. For example,
substance abusers, who typically exhibit poor inhibitory control (Groman, James, & Jentsch,
2009; Hoaken, Giancola, & Pihl, 1998), have demonstrated improved Stroop performance
following a course of goal management training (GMT; Robertson, Levine, & Manly, 2005)
with an added mindfulness component, whereas those who received GMT alone did not show
improvements in inhibitory control (Alfonso, Caracuel, Delgado-Pastor, & Verdejo-Garcia,
2011). Additional research is needed to determine whether other populations characterized by
poor inhibitory control (e.g., criminal or otherwise aggressive samples) exhibit similar
improvements in executive functioning following mindfulness interventions. Given that
aggressive behavior is associated with decreased inhibitory control (e.g., Broomhall, 2005;
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Cohen et al., 2003) and mindfulness interventions have been shown to decrease aggressive
behavior (e.g., Chapman et al., 2013; Fix & Fix, 2013), it is important that changes to
inhibitory control be evaluated as a potential mechanism for these changes.

Empirical Associations Between Aggressive Behavior and Response Inhibition

In a meta-analysis of executive functioning studies with antisocial populations
specifically, Morgan and Lilienfeld (2000) found a medium to large effect of executive
functioning and reported that antisocial individuals performed .62 standard deviations worse
than controls on executive functioning tests. Though they did not provide results for various
executive functions individually, the authors concluded that executive functioning deficits in
general appear to play an important role in aggressive behavior and should continue to be
explored in our attempt to understand mechanisms influencing aggression. In other research,
specific associations between response inhibition deficits and aggressive behavior have also
been well established, both in special populations (e.g., criminal offenders: Broomhall, 2005;
Fishbein, 2000; Foster, Hillbrand, & Silverstein, 1993; Hancock, Tapscott, & Hoaken, 2010,
and IPV perpetrators: Cohen, Brumm, Zawacki, Paul, Sweet, & Rosenbaum, 2003; Westby &
Ferraro, 1999) and in the general population (Denny & Siemer, 2012; Pawliczek et al., 2013),
supporting the notion that variations in response inhibition specifically may be key in
predicting and mitigating aggressive behavior. Deficits in response inhibition may be
especially important in understanding impulsive aggression, such as aggressive behavior
which is reflexively engaged in as a response to provocation. However, it is important to note
that few studies (e.g., Broomhall, 2005; Villemarette-Pittman et al., 2002) distinguish between
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impulsive aggression and aggression which is premeditated and goal oriented (i.e.,
instrumental).

Response Inhibition of Criminal Offenders

Broomhall (2005) conducted the only known evaluation of executive functioning in
criminal offenders that distinguishes between types of aggression. He classified violent male
offenders as either predominant reactively aggressive (e.g., impulsive, unplanned aggression)
or predominant instrumentally aggressive (e.g., goal-oriented, premeditated aggression) and
assessed their executive functioning with a number of measures, including the Color-Word
subtest, which is a variation of the Stroop task included in the Delis-Kaplan Executive
Functioning System (D-KEFS; Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). Results indicated that
reactively aggressive offenders performed more poorly than instrumentally aggressive
offenders on the inhibition/switching task of the Color-Word test, which required them to say
the ink color of the color word, unless there was a box around the word, in which case they
were to read the color word and ignore the ink color. There was also a trend for reactively
aggressive offenders to perform more poorly on the Color-Word inhibition task, which
required them to name the ink color of the color word (which did not match the word itself).
These differences suggest that the reactively aggressive offenders had difficulty inhibiting a
dominant, overlearned response (i.e., naming the color instead of reading the word), as well as
difficulty with flexibly switching mental sets (e.g., following the correct rule on the ColorWord inhibition/switching task).
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Hancock and colleagues (2010) identified deficits across several domains of executive
functioning in a sample of male inmates, including specific evidence of increased impulsivity
and difficulties with response inhibition. Participants completed the D-KEFS Tower Test,
which required them to create a given pattern while following a series of specific rules.
Results indicated that lower mean first move time, which is an indicator of impulsive
responding, was associated with a higher frequency of violent crimes. Further, violent crime
severity was associated with slower performance on the inhibition/switching portion of the DKEFS Color-Word subtest. Together, these results suggest that increased impulsivity and
difficulties with response inhibition may contribute to aggressive behavior.
Foster and colleagues (1993) conducted a year-long prospective study in which they
tracked the aggressive behavior of male forensic patients who had committed a violent crime.
They assessed response inhibition via the Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST; Heaton, 1981). To complete the WCST, which is typically computer administered,
participants are presented with four target cards containing stimuli that vary based on color,
shape, and number (e.g., a card may have one red circle or three blue stars). They are then
given a deck of similar cards and asked to sort them (by color, number, or shape) in front of
the four stimulus cards. After each card is laid (e.g., two red triangles are placed under one red
circle because they are the same color), participants are told if they have sorted correctly or
incorrectly. After the participant sorts 10 cards correctly (the first sorting rule is color), the
sorting rule changes and they are required to figure out the new rule (i.e., sort the cards by
shape or number) based on feedback provided to them. Response inhibition deficits are
represented by participants’ frequency of perseverative errors (i.e., incorrect responses that
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follow a discontinued sorting rule). Foster and colleagues’ (1993) results indicated that poorer
Stroop performance, as assessed at the beginning of the study, predicted more severe and
more frequent aggression over the course of the year. In contrast, perseverative errors on the
WCST were not associated with patients’ aggression. However, Fishbein (2000) reported
results from an unpublished data set, in which she found that violent criminal offenders
performed more poorly on the Stroop task and the WCST as compared to nonviolent
offenders, again suggesting that difficulties with response inhibition may be implicated in
aggressive behavior.

Response Inhibition of Intimate Partner Violence Offenders

Cohen, Rosenbaum, Kane, Warnken, and Benjamin (1999) used the WCST and the
Adaptive Rate Continuous Performance Test (ARCPT; Cohen, 1993) to compare the
executive functioning of male IPV offenders to maritally discordant and non-discordant male
controls. The ARCPT is a computerized task that requires participants to identify target
stimuli when they follow various specific rules (e.g., press a key for an X when it is preceded
by the letter A). Problems with response inhibition are indicated by ARCPT false-positive
errors (i.e., pressing a key when a target stimulus has not been presented). Results provided
greater evidence of response inhibition problems among offenders compared to both control
groups, as evidenced by the significantly higher number of WCST perseverative errors and
ARCPT false-positive errors made by the IPV offenders.
In a subsequent study, Cohen and colleagues (2003) identified a number of tests of
executive functioning specifically associated with impulsivity and used them to evaluate the
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response-inhibition abilities of male IPV offenders and non-offending male controls. They
administered the Stroop task, the TMT, Go/No-Go tasks, the ARCPT, and the Porteus Maze
task (Porteus, 1965). The TMT consists of two subtests: Trails A requires participants to draw
lines to connect a series of randomly arranged numbers in sequence (e.g., 1, 2, 3), whereas
Trails B requires participants to alternately connect numbers and letters (e.g., 1, A, 2, B) in
sequence. Because Trails B requires the suppression of an overlearned response (i.e., connect
numbers to numbers and letters to letters) in favor of a more novel response; the number of
set-loss errors committed can be used as an indicator of impulsive and disinhibited
responding. Response inhibition was captured on the Porteus mazes by assessing the number
of times a participant crossed a line, which is thought to be indicative of impulsivity and
haphazard responding (Porteus, 1965). Results revealed that IPV offenders evidenced more
problems with response inhibition than controls on the majority of the tasks, as indicated by
more set-loss errors on Trails B, higher Stroop interference scores, more false-positive
responses on the ARCPT, and more line crossing on the Porteus mazes. They did not find
significant differences between offenders and controls on the Go/No-Go tasks; however, the
overall pattern of results suggests that IPV offenders experience significantly more problems
with response inhibition than men who do not perpetrate intimate partner violence.
Schafer and Fals-Stewart (2000) recruited couples in which the husbands were
recovering from substance use disorders. They measured husbands’ capacities for response
inhibition using the Stroop task and the TMT. Results revealed that poorer performances on
the Stroop task and Trails B were associated with more total couple violence, total husbandto-wife violence, and severe husband-to-wife violence. In another study, Stanford, Conklin,
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Helfritz, and Kockler (2007) used the TMT and the WCST to compare the response inhibition
capacities of male IPV offenders to nonviolent controls. Their results showed that the
offenders made more errors on Trails B and had more failures to maintain set on the WCST,
suggesting that they had more problems with impulsive and disinhibited responding than
controls.
Westby and Ferraro (1999) examined response inhibition in male IPV offenders
compared to age- and education-matched controls without a history of domestic violence.
Controlling for alcohol use and cognitive ability, they found that IPV offenders took
significantly longer to complete Trails B, which may be attributable to difficulty inhibiting
dominant responses. However, offenders did not perform differently than controls on other
measures of response inhibition, including the Stroop task and the WCST. Thus, Westby and
Ferraro’s (1999) results are only partially consistent with research that has found associations
between aggression and problems with inhibition in IPV offenders and other populations (e.g.,
violent offenders).
Finally, Walling, Meehan, Marshall, Holtzworth-Munroe, and Taft (2012) evaluated
response inhibition in a sample of community men who had committed IPV, as indicated via
self- and partner report, compared to nonviolent maritally discordant controls. In contrast to
previous findings, results revealed no response-inhibition differences between offenders and
controls as assessed by Trails B and the WCST. However, total and perseverative errors on
the WCST were significantly positively correlated with IPV frequency. Further, when the
men were grouped into perpetration subtypes (i.e., family only, low-level antisocial, severe
borderline dysphoric/generally violent antisocial), the severely violent men made significantly
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more total and perseverative errors on the WCST compared to controls. The authors
concluded that response inhibition impairments may be most evident in severely violent men
as opposed to men with a history of more mild domestic violence.
While there are some exceptions in which differences in inhibitory control were not
found between offenders and controls, the majority of findings suggest that males who
commit violent offenses perform more poorly on tests of response inhibition than their nonoffending counterparts. However, these studies are limited to examining associations between
response inhibition and historical acts of violence and aggression. In order to conclude that
inhibitory control deficits contribute to aggressive behavior, it is necessary to assess response
inhibition prior to assessments of aggressive behavior.

Associations Between Response Inhibition and Aggression
in the General Population

In addition to evaluating the effects of response inhibition deficits on aggression in
populations characterized by aggressive behavior (e.g., violent criminals, IPV offenders),
research has explored these associations in the general population. Such studies have
repeatedly shown that self-reported aggressive behavior is associated with response-inhibition
deficits on tests of executive functioning (e.g., Denny & Siemer, 2012; Pawliczek et al.,
2013). Further, associations between executive functioning deficits and increased aggressive
behavior in the laboratory have also been found (e.g., Giancola & Zeichner, 1994; Lau, Pihl,
& Peterson, 1995); however, laboratory studies have predominantly evaluated executive
functioning more generally and have not assessed differences in aggression related to
response inhibition or impulsivity specifically.
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Response Inhibition and Self-Reported Aggression

Villemarette-Pittman and colleagues (2002) conducted the only known research to
specifically evaluate associations between executive functioning and impulsive aggression (as
opposed to aggression more generally) in a general population sample. Using self-report
questionnaires to identify male and female undergraduate students who were either
impulsively aggressive or non-aggressive, Villemarette-Pittman and colleagues (2002) found
that impulsively aggressive students performed more poorly on tests of executive functioning
than controls. However, assessments of response inhibition were not included in their
evaluation of executive functioning, so these findings cannot be extended to responseinhibition deficits more specifically.
Giancola, Roth, and Parrott (2006) also found an association between executive
functioning and self-reported aggression and, unlike Villemarette-Pittman and colleagues
(2002), they included assessments of response inhibition (i.e., Stroop, Trails B, WCST) in
their executive functioning assessment battery. Results indicated that lower overall
performance across measures of executive functioning was associated with greater selfreported physical aggression on the AQ for both males and females. However, because the
authors did not present separate results for each assessment of executive functioning,
conclusions about the unique associations between response inhibition and aggression cannot
be drawn from.
Denny and Siemer (2012) administered a Go/No-Go task in which male and female
undergraduate students were to respond as quickly as possible to frequent target stimuli while
inhibiting responses to less frequent, non-target stimuli. Angry and happy faces were
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alternately used as the target and non-target stimuli. Denny and Siemer (2012) found that
participants’ total scores on the AQ were associated with poorer response inhibition when the
angry faces were used as the non-target stimuli; however, aggression was unrelated to
participants’ response inhibition to happy faces. They concluded that higher trait aggression
might only be associated with problems with response inhibition in response to anger-related
cues, suggesting that response inhibition deficits in aggressive individuals may exist primarily
in the context of provocation. One possible interpretation of these findings is that the
response inhibition abilities of aggressive individuals do not differ from those of nonaggressive individuals until they are provoked, at which time aggressive individuals’ capacity
for response inhibition is depleted.
Pawliczek et al. (2013) conducted a similar study in which male students responded to
angry and neutral faces, unless a yellow border appeared around the face, in which case they
were instructed to inhibit their response. Participants high in trait aggression, based on their
total scores on the AQ, had more difficulty inhibiting responses to non-target stimuli.
Interestingly, in contrast to Denny and Siemer’s (2012) findings, both the high and low
aggression groups were better at inhibiting responses to angry faces than to neutral faces.
These findings are consistent with others that suggest that aggressive individuals have more
difficulty with response inhibition in general, and they do not support Denny and Siemer’s
(2012) theory that response inhibition differences may only be present in the context of
provocation.
Together, these studies of response inhibition associations with self-reported
aggression suggest that individuals who report higher levels of trait aggression and aggressive
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behavior exhibit significantly greater deficits in response inhibition. However, these studies
are correlational in nature and do not assess response inhibition at the time of aggressive
behavior. Accordingly, these findings cannot be used to draw conclusions about individual
differences in response inhibition in the context of aggressive behavior. It may be that
aggressive individuals exhibit poorer response inhibition across contexts compared to less
aggressive individuals. However, as Denny and Siemer’s (2012) findings might suggest,
aggressive individuals may only have problems with response inhibition in the context of
provocation or other cues for aggressive behavior. In order to evaluate whether aggressive
individuals’ capacity for response inhibition is depleted by provocation and whether this
contributes directly to aggressive behavior, response inhibition and behavioral assessments of
aggression must be assessed together in the context of provocation.

Response Inhibition and Aggression in the Laboratory

In the laboratory setting, Hoaken, Shaughnessy, and Pihl (2003) evaluated associations
between executive functioning and aggression in mixed-gender samples of undergraduates
and healthy community adults. Participants who performed in the high and low quartiles on
two assessments of executive functioning, the Spatial Conditional Associative-Learning Tasks
(SCALT; Petrides, 1985) and Self-Ordered Pointing Tasks (SOP; Petrides & Milner, 1982),
were asked to complete the entire study. Response inhibition was measured using a Go/NoGo discrimination task prior to participants’ completion of the TAP. Participants in the lower
quartile for executive functioning delivered significantly more intense shocks than those in
the high quartile, and they made more errors on the Go/No-Go task, which was non-
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significant but trending. The authors did not provide results for associations between
aggressive behavior and response inhibition on the Go/No-Go task; however, these overall
results indicate that individuals with generally poor executive functioning abilities both
demonstrate more difficulties with response inhibition and a greater propensity for impulsive
aggression than those with generally strong executive functioning abilities.
Santor, Ingram, and Kusumakar (2003) evaluated the effects of executive functioning
on verbal aggression in a sample of community adolescents. Participants first completed two
tests of executive functioning that primarily measure active monitoring in working memory:
the Conditional Associative-Learning Tasks (CALT; Petrides, 1985) and SOP tasks.
Subsequently, participants participated in a modified version of the TAP in which they
ostensibly competed in a visual search task and sent and received verbal messages of varying
offensiveness (i.e., degrees of provocation). Results revealed that executive functioning
moderated the relationship between provocation and verbal aggression. When faced with
increasingly offensive comments from their opponents, those with lower executive
functioning abilities responded with more aggression than those with higher executive
functioning abilities. However, verbal aggression was unrelated to executive functioning
abilities when opponents administered decreasingly offensive verbal messages. This suggests
that executive functioning deficits may predispose individuals to aggressive behavior, but
only when provoked.
Giancola and Zeichner (1994) used a similar study design with a sample of community
men. Participants first completed CALT and SOP tasks, followed by the TAP. Men who
performed poorly on CALT tasks were more aggressive (i.e., delivered more intense shocks)
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than those who performed well; however, this relationship was not observed with SOP tasks.
Giancola and Zeichner (1994) did not evaluate the effects of provocation. Finally, in a third
study of this kind, executive functioning was represented by a composite of community men’s
CALT and SOP performances, and deficits in these domains were found to significantly
predict aggression on the TAP (Lau et al., 1995). While these results do not directly evaluate
the effect of inhibitory control on aggressive behavior, they do demonstrate a relationship
between executive functioning deficits and actual aggressive behavior, observed in the
laboratory, in the context of a non-clinical population. It is important to extend this research to
response inhibition specifically in order to determine whether inhibitory control impacts
aggressive responding directly at the time of provocation.

Summary and Conclusions

Research that utilizes behavioral assessments of aggression is limited; however, there
is strong support in retrospective and self-report studies to demonstrate that aggressive
behavior is associated with response-inhibition deficits, both in groups characterized by
aggression (Broomhall, 2005; Fishbein, 2000; Foster et al., 1993; Hancock et al., 2010;
Westby & Ferraro, 1999) and in samples from the general population (Denny & Siemer,
2012; Pawliczek et al., 2013). Based on these studies, it appears that we can conclude that
aggressive individuals tend to have more difficulties inhibiting automatic responses, which
may contribute to their tendency to be aggressive. Nevertheless, these studies are essentially
correlational in nature; we know that aggressive individuals tend to have poorer inhibitory
control, but we don’t know that response inhibition deficits contribute causally to aggressive
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behavior. To answer this question, aggressive behavior needs to be assessed behaviorally in
the context of experimentally manipulated response inhibition. If aggression is shown to vary
based on the degree of experimentally manipulated response inhibition, we could more
confidently conclude that inhibitory control has a causal effect on aggressive behavior.
Presently, no known studies of this kind exist.

Summary and Present Study Objectives

In conclusion, mindfulness-based interventions are being increasingly used to reduce
aggressive behavior; however, the mechanisms through which increases in mindfulness are
associated with reductions in aggression are not well understood. Extant research suggests
that mindfulness-induced alterations to inhibitory control might be a potential mechanism for
this effect; however, prior research has not empirically evaluated this hypothesis. Further,
while correlational associations between deficits in response inhibition and aggression have
been well established, available research does not demonstrate whether this relationship is
causal. Finally, experimental studies have shown that mindfulness-based interventions can
improve response inhibition, yet the amount of mindfulness training necessary to induce such
effects has not been established. It may be that effective inhibitory control is a component of
state mindfulness, in which case extensive training in mindfulness would not be necessary to
produce improvements in response inhibition. Rather, temporary inhibitory control
enhancements might be experienced as the result of a single successful mindfulness induction.
In order to address these gaps in the extant literature and to evaluate inhibitory control as a
potential mediator of the relationship between mindfulness and aggressive behavior, the
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present study evaluated whether a single mindfulness induction could produce improvements
in inhibitory control and whether such improvements have a subsequent impact on
participants’ likelihood of behaving aggressively in response to provocation.

Hypothesis 1

Prior research has demonstrated that mindful individuals, including those who are
experiencing mindfulness for the first time (e.g., Heppner et al., 2008), display less impulsive
aggression following provocation than participants who are not mindful. Accordingly,
Hypothesis 1 predicted that participants who were exposed to a mindfulness induction would
engage in less impulsive aggression in response to provocation compared to controls.

Hypothesis 2

In previous studies, participants who received brief mindfulness training and then
participated in a mindfulness induction demonstrated superior response inhibition compared
to controls (e.g., Friese et al., 2012; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Accordingly, Hypothesis 2
predicted that subjects who participated in a mindfulness induction, without the brief
mindfulness training, would exhibit better response inhibition than controls, controlling for
baseline differences in response inhibition.

Hypothesis 3

It has been argued that deficits in response inhibition can contribute to aggressive
behavior, and individuals who behave aggressively have been repeatedly shown to exhibit
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poorer inhibitory control than non-aggressive participants (e.g., Cohen, 1993). Accordingly,
Hypothesis 3 predicted that participants’ capacity for response inhibition would predict
aggressive behavior in the context of provocation.

Hypothesis 4

Extant research indicates both that mindfulness can improve inhibitory control and
that inhibitory control deficits are associated with aggressive behavior (Cohen, 1993; WenkSormaz, 2005). As such, between-groups differences (i.e., mindfulness versus control) in
response inhibition following a mindfulness induction were expected to mediate the
relationship between state mindfulness and aggressive behavior.

Research Question

Prior research has not evaluated the differential impact of state mindfulness on
aggression at increasing levels of provocation. Individuals typically respond to increasing
levels of provocation with increasing aggression (e.g., Santor et al., 2003). However, given
the tendency toward non-judgment and acceptance inherent in mindfulness, mindful
individuals might be expected to show low levels of aggressive responding, regardless of the
level of provocation experienced. Accordingly, mindful individuals might exhibit a
significantly less drastic increase in aggressive behavior in response to increasing
provocation, as compared to individuals who are not mindful (i.e., controls). However, it may
also be that mindful individuals respond to provocation with less aggression overall but are
equally impacted by increases in provocation as are non-mindful individuals. To evaluate
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these possibilities in the present study, between-groups changes in aggression in response to
increasing provocation were compared. However, because no prior research is available to
support either of these potential outcomes, no a priori hypothesis about the nature of the
relationship was made.

CHAPTER 2
METHOD

Participants

Participants were recruited from introduction to psychology courses at Northern
Illinois University and were awarded course credit for participation. All of the students had
the option to participate in mass testing, a large in-person survey conducted at the start of each
semester and used to screen students for participation in various studies. Participants were
invited to participate in the present study based on their responses to mass-testing questions
regarding age (all participants were 18-25 years of age), gender (only males were recruited),
color-blindness (participants with color-blindness were excluded) and aggressive behavior
(only aggressive individuals were invited). Participation was restricted to individuals 18-25 in
order to obtain an emerging adulthood sample, which minimizes potential age effects on
executive functioning. Individuals who had prior experience with mindfulness (e.g., through
therapy, yoga, or meditation) were also excluded; however, prior experience was assessed
after participation in the study in order to avoid priming effects.
Gender differences are to be expected with regard to aggressive behavior (e.g.,
Giancola et al., 2006; Hoaken et al., 2003), often necessitating that assessments of
associations between aggressive behavior and other constructs be conducted separately for
men and women. Historically, research on aggression and inhibitory control has been
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conducted primarily with men, and there is more empirical support for these associations
among men than women (e.g., Broomhall, 2005; Cohen et al., 2003; Hancock et al., 2010).
Therefore, in order to avoid the potential need to split the sample and conduct analyses
separately for each gender, only male students were invited to participate.
Prior research suggests that the hypothesized effects of mindfulness and response
inhibition on aggressive behavior are present in the general population (e.g., Giancola et al.,
2006; Heppner et al., 2008). However, empirical support for associations between
mindfulness and aggression and inhibitory control and aggression is stronger in aggressive
populations (e.g., criminals and IPV offenders) and those high in trait aggression than for the
general population overall (e.g., Cohen et al., 2003; Hancock et al., 2010; Pawliczek et al.,
2013; Wupperman et al., 2012). Further, because research has established that trait-aggressive
individuals have poorer inhibitory control than those who are not more aggressive than
average (e.g., Denny & Siemer, 2012; Pawliczek et al., 2013), only aggressive individuals
were included in an attempt to prevent ceiling effects from potentially minimizing the
hypothesized effect of mindfulness on inhibitory control.

Sample Size

In the only known study to evaluate the effect of a mindfulness induction on
aggressive behavior for mindfulness-naïve participants, Heppner et al. (2008) found a
significant effect of mindfulness with a sample size of 60, with 20 participants in each of three
groups; however, Heppner and colleagues (2008) did not report effect size estimates. With
regard to the association between mindfulness and response inhibition, significant effects of
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mindfulness have been found with group sizes n = 40 (Tang et al., 2007), n = 33 (Friese et al.,
2012), and n = 40 (Wenk-Sormaz, 2005). Of these studies, only Friese et al. (2012) published
estimates of effect size, indicating a medium-size effect (d = .54) for the relationship between
mindfulness and inhibitory control when mindfulness is induced in the laboratory (based on
Cohen’s [1988] guidelines for determining a small, medium, and large effect). Because the
present study is the first known evaluation of the impact of inhibitory control on aggressive
behavior measured in the laboratory, no estimates of effect size were available for
determining the appropriate sample size. However, medium-size effects (r = .33-.37) have
been found for the association between executive functioning more generally and aggressive
behavior in the laboratory with a sample of N = 72 (Giancola & Zeichner, 1994). Further,
small (r = .26; Denny & Siemer, 2012) to medium (η2 = .13; Pawliczek et al., 2013) effects
have been found for associations between self-reported aggression and inhibitory control with
sample sizes of N = 112 and N = 33, respectively.
Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) provide recommended sample sizes for mediation based
on the significance test to be used and the expected effect sizes of the alpha and beta paths of
the mediation. The only published effect size for the alpha path (the relationship between
mindfulness and inhibitory control when mindfulness is induced in the laboratory) suggested
that a medium effect size (d = .54) could be expected in the present study. Estimates for the
beta path (the relationship between inhibitory control and aggressive behavior in the
laboratory) were not available; however, similar studies suggested that a medium effect might
be expected. When a medium effect is expected for both the alpha and beta paths, Fritz and
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MacKinnon (2007) recommend a sample size of 71 to achieve power = .80 with a biascorrected bootstrap test of significance.
To determine the sample size necessary for the proposed analyses of covariance
(ANCOVA), which were used to evaluate Hypothesis 2 (i.e., that the individuals in the
mindfulness group would perform better on the measure of response inhibition than the
controls, controlling for their response inhibition at baseline), a power analysis was conducted
using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). To achieve power = .80 to
detect a medium effect size (d = .54) with an alpha= .05, the recommended sample size was N
= 103. Based on these sample size recommendations, a sample size of N = 104 was sought.
Sixteen hundred thirty-one participants completed mass testing. Of those, 231 met the
requirements described above and were invited to participate. One hundred fifteen
participants completed the full study. Data for 14 participants were excluded due to
participant and experimenter errors during data collection. Twenty-eight participants were
removed because of prior experience with yoga, mindfulness, and/or meditation. Finally, data
from eight participants who reported low levels of paying attention, following directions, and
attending to the breath during the manipulation were excluded. Data from 65 participants
were included in the final analyses. After the data were cleaned, the group sizes remained
roughly equal, with 35 participants in the control group and 30 participants in the mindfulness
group.
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Self-Report Measures

Demographic Questionnaire

Participants completed a short demographic questionnaire, that assessed individual
differences including age, race/ethnicity, family income, and education (Appendix A).
Participants ranged in age from 18 to 25, with a mean age of 19 years old (SD = 1.48). Thirtyone participants identified as Caucasian (48%), 22 identified as African American (34%), 5
identified as Hispanic/Latino (8%), 2 identified as East Asian/Asian American (3%), and 5
participants self-identified as multi-racial or other (8%).

Aggression Questionnaire (AQ)

The AQ (Buss & Perry, 1992) is a 29-item self-report measure of aggression,
including estimates of physical aggression, verbal aggression, hostility, and anger.
Participants use a 5-point Likert scale to indicate the degree to which they believe each
statement describes them, from 1 (extremely uncharacteristic of me) to 5 (extremely
characteristic of me). Higher scores correspond with greater aggression, anger, and hostility.
A total score for the AQ has been used widely to distinguish between high and low trait
aggressiveness (Pawliczek et al., 2013) and to attempt to quantify trait aggressiveness more
generally (Denny & Siemer, 2012). However, confirmatory factor analysis results have
demonstrated that the items do not reliably load onto one overall factor (Bryant & Smith,
2001). Similarly, the 29 items have not been found to consistently load onto their intended
factors (Bryant & Smith, 2001; Vigil-Colet, Lorenzo-Seva, Codorniu-Raga, & Morales, 2005;
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Williams, Boyd, Cascardi, & Poythress, 1996). Accordingly, Bryant and Smith (2001) caution
against calculating a total score for the AQ. Instead, they recommend the use of individual
subscale scores and a shortened 12-item version of the AQ, which includes the three highest
loading items for each factor, identified using principal components analysis. Bryant and
Smith (2001) also advocate for altering the Likert scale from 5 to 6 points in order to require
participants to identify whether each characteristic is more like or unlike them, as opposed to
allowing them to select a neutral midpoint. They evaluated the goodness of fit for their new
short form in three different samples and concluded that the 12-item measure with a fourfactor model is a significant improvement over the 29-item, one-factor model and provides an
appropriate measurement model for the AQ. Bryant and Smith (2001) demonstrated that the
subscales of the AQ-SF have good internal reliability (physical aggression: α = .80, verbal
aggression: α = .80, anger: α = .76, and hostility: α = .80).
Given the poor fit of the factor structure of the original AQ and space limitations with
regard to the number of items that could be administered at mass testing, Bryant and Smith’s
(2001) short form of the AQ (AQ-SF, Appendix B) was utilized in the present study.
Participants’ total scores on the three-item physical aggression subscale (3. Given enough
provocation, I may hit another person, 8. There are people that pushed me so far that we came
to blows, and 11. I have threatened people I know), which they completed during mass
testing, were used to determine students’ eligibility for participation.
Acceptable internal consistency was found for the verbal aggression (α = .76), anger
(α = .66), and hostility (α = .72) subscales in the present sample. However, the internal
consistency for the physical aggression subscale was unacceptably low (α = .08). This
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suggests that the three items included in the physical aggression subscale may be assessing
different components of physical aggression that are not necessarily correlated for the
participants in this sample. As a result, the AQ-SF may not have captured a subsample of the
mass-testing participants who have similar histories of aggressive behavior. The poor
reliability of the physical aggression subscale also calls participants’ commitment to the masstesting assessment into question. That is, it is tempting to attribute the poor reliability of the
physical aggression subscale to participants not taking the assessment seriously. However, the
reliability of the other subscales was much greater and in the acceptable range, which
indicates that careless or random participant responding is likely not the reason for the poor
physical aggression subscale reliability. Regardless of the cause of the poor reliability, higher
physical aggression subscale scores do represent greater endorsement of aggressive behavior,
so participants’ mean physical aggression subscale scores were used to determine eligibility
as planned. Participants who scored above average (M = 7.05 for the present sample) on the
AQ-SF physical aggression subscale were invited to participate.

Manipulation Check Questionnaire

In order to evaluate whether participants followed instructions and participated in the
manipulation as instructed, and to ensure that the TAP deception operated as expected,
participants were asked various questions about how they experienced each task. Questions
about prior experience with mindfulness and meditation were also included in the
manipulation check questionnaire (Appendix C).
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All of the participants were asked the question, “How much were you paying attention
to the recording?” On a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 8 (Very much), participants had a mean
response of 5.40 (SD = 1.39), with a median response of 6, suggesting that they were
generally attempting to focus on the recording. Participants in the mindfulness group also
answered questions pertaining specifically to the mindfulness manipulation. Using the same
scale for the question, “How much did you attempt to follow the directions in the recording?”
participants provided a mean response of 6.13 (SD = 1.55) and median response of 6.0,
indicating that the majority of them were diligent in attempting to follow instructions.
Participants in the mindfulness group were also asked, “How much of the time do you think
you were actually focused on your breathing during the exercise?” On a scale from 1 (None at
all) to 8 (The entire time), participants had a mean response of 4.80 (SD = 1.27) and a median
response of 5. Individuals are not expected to be able to focus on their breathing for the
duration of a focused breathing exercise. Rather, the objective is to attempt to focus on one’s
breathing and non-judgmentally return one’s attention to the breath upon realizing the mind
has wandered. Accordingly, the median response of 5, which suggests that the participants
were at least attempting to focus on their breath, is consistent with what would be expected
from a focusedbreathing induction.
When asked, “How confident were you that you were competing against a ‘real’
opponent?” participants provided a mean response of 3.28 (SD = 2.04) and a median response
of 3 on a scale from 1 (Not at all) to 8 (Very much). The language in the question, which was
asked after the task was completed, primed participants to be skeptical about the veracity of
the competition they had completed, which could have influenced them to report less
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confidence than they had actually experienced during the task. However, the fact that the
modal response was 1 (n = 17) suggests that the deception was not successful for many of the
participants. As a result, participants may not have been adequately provoked to behave
aggressively.

Laboratory-Based Measures

Taylor Aggression Paradigm (TAP)

Aggression was assessed with a modified version of the TAP (Taylor, 1967), a widely
used and well-validated analog measure of aggressive behavior (Bernstein, Richardson, &
Hammock, 1987; Giancola & Zeichner, 1995). In the TAP, participants ostensibly compete
one-on-one with another participant in a reaction-time task, in which the winner of the task
delivers an aversive stimulus (e.g., shock, noise blast) to the loser. However, the opponent is
fictional, and the outcome of each trial (i.e., win versus loss and the intensity of the stimuli
delivered to a participant upon a loss) is fixed and predetermined by the experimenter.
The TAP was administered in conjunction with the Stroop task via the computer-based
research program SuperLab 4.5 (Cedrus Corporation, San Pedro, CA). Specifically, the
standard reaction-time task (which requires participants to depress a key until cued to release
it in an attempt to release the key more quickly than their opponent) was replaced by a block
of trials of the Stroop task. Aside from this substitution, the standard administration of the
TAP was not altered.
At the outset of each round of the TAP, participants selected the degree of loudness
(i.e., intensity) of a noise blast that would be delivered to their opponent in the event that the
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opponent were to lose the competition for that round (i.e., when the opponent ostensibly
responded more slowly and with more errors on the Stroop trials). After each round of the
TAP, participants either received a blast of noise or they were shown the level of noise blast
their opponent selected for them to receive.
While the original TAP utilized shocks as the aversive stimulus, more recent
modifications deliver aversive stimuli in the form of white-noise blasts in order to minimize
the risk of harm to participants (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Heppner et al., 2008).
Consistent with recent studies (e.g., Bushman & Baumeister, 1998), the range of noise-blast
volume participants received ranged from 65 decibels (level 2) to 100 decibels (level 9),
increasing by five decibels for each level of intensity. Participants were given the opportunity
to send noise blasts corresponding with levels 1-10; however, they never received a level 1 or
level 10 blast. The specific stimulus used for the noise blasts was selected from a standardized
set of emotionally evocative stimuli (Bradley & Lang, 2007) for its exceptionally low
pleasure rating (M =2.42, SD = 1.62) and high arousal rating (M =7.98, SD = 1.62) on 9-point
scales of pleasure and arousal.
Consistent with more recent modifications of the original structure of the TAP
(Wallace & Taylor, 2009), the administration of the TAP consisted of one initial round, three
sets of four rounds (corresponding with low-, moderate-, and high-intensity noise blasts
received from the opponent), and one transition round between the low and moderate and
moderate and high sets, for a total of 15 noise-blast rounds. Thus, participants made15
determinations of the level of noise blast their opponent would receive upon a loss.
Participants “won” the initial round, “lost” the two transition rounds, and “won” 50% of the
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remaining rounds. However, in order to maintain the deception that participants were
competing against an opponent, participants “lost” any round in which they took an
exceptionally long time to respond (e.g., due to distraction from the task), regardless of
whether a win or loss was predetermined for that round.
In the first set of TAP rounds (low provocation), the noise-blast intensity set by the
“opponent” varied from 65 decibels (level 2) to 70 decibels (level 3). Second-set (moderate
provocation) rounds included blasts ranging from 80 decibels (level 5) to 85 decibels (level
6), and third-set (high provocation) rounds included blasts ranging from 95 decibels (level 8)
to 100 decibels (level 9). Participants received noise blasts of 75 decibels (level 4) and 90
decibels (level 7) at the end of the first and second transition rounds, respectively. Transition
rounds were included to allow the increase in provocation to appear more gradual while also
allowing the level of provocation in each set to be distinct.
The dependent measure of aggression is the average noise-blast intensity selected by
the participant across Rounds 2 through 15. The noise-blast intensity selected during the first
round was not included in the intensity score because participants selected it in the absence of
provocation. Accordingly, the first-round noise blast is not an adequate measure of reactive
aggression, which is the specific type of aggression of interest in the present study.

Stroop Task

A computer-adapted version of the Stroop task (Stroop, 1935) was administered as a
measure of participants’ capacity for response inhibition. The Stroop task, which has been
described as a “prototypical” (Miyake et al., 2000, p. 57) and “canonical” (Teper & Inzlicht,
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2013, p. 1) measure of response inhibition, has repeatedly shown strong reliability and
validity across a wide variety of populations and variations in administration (Macleod,
1991). During the Stroop task, a trial consists of a color word (i.e., red, yellow, blue, and
green) being presented on a computer screen that participants respond to by using a colorcoded keypad to indicate the color of the ink in which the word is printed. In congruent trials,
the color of the ink matches the word (e.g., “red” printed in red ink). In incongruent trials, the
color of the ink does not match the word (e.g., “yellow” printed in blue ink). Participants also
name the colors of neutral stimuli (i.e., XXX printed in red, yellow, blue, or green ink).
Finally, the Stroop task also typically includes word-reading trials, in which the color words
are printed in black ink (e.g., “yellow,” “red,” and “blue” all printed in black ink) and
participants are asked to simply read the word rather than name the ink color).
In the present study, participants completed the Stroop task twice: once at the
beginning of the study in order to obtain a baseline estimate of inhibitory control and once
following the mindfulness/control manipulation. The second administration of the Stroop task
was combined with the TAP.
During the baseline administration of the Stroop task, participants first completed a
block of 30 word reading trials (i.e., 30 color words, presented one at a time, in black ink) in
order to obtain an estimate of each participant’s reading fluency. They then completed a block
of 90 trials that included congruent (30 trials), incongruent (30 trials), and neutral (30 trials)
color-naming stimuli, presented in a seemingly random order. Participants’ mean response
times are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1
Mean Response Times by Trial Type and Condition

Baseline neutral trials
ST neutral trials
Baseline congruent trials
ST congruent trials
Baseline incongruent trials
ST incongruent trials

Control
M(SD)
741.45 (101.77)
733.61 (115.47)
770.08 (107.74)
640.46
(94.28)
889.51 (150.40)
741.45 (150.55)

Mindfulness
M(SD)
791.17 (96.98)
756.38 (90.47)
836.08 (112.19)
691.86 (99.93)
965.16 (126.33)
786.39 (141.69)

Note. Control n = 35; Mindfulness n = 30. ST = Stroop/Tap procedure.

During the combined Stroop/TAP task, participants completed a mixed block of 30
Stroop trials during each of the 15 rounds of the TAP, for a total of 450 trials. Each mixed
block contained 10 congruent trials, 10 incongruent trials, and 10 neutral trials, presented in a
seemingly random order. Black-ink word reading trials were not included in the second
administration of the Stroop task.
In both administrations of the Stroop task, each word remained on the screen until the
participant responded. The dependent measures of response inhibition are participants’
interference scores (i.e., the degree to which the dominant word reading response interferes
with the ability to name ink colors) and number of errors made during incongruent trials,
where more errors and greater interference represent poorer inhibitory control. Errors during
neutral and congruent trials are not included in the error calculation because they do not
require participants to inhibit dominant word reading responses and, as such, do not
operationalize inhibitory control. For the baseline estimate of response inhibition, each of the
90 baseline Stroop trials were included in the error and interference score calculations.
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However, the post-induction estimate of response inhibition was calculated using only the
trials from the first round of the Stroop/TAP procedure. Upon completion of these first 30
Stroop trials, participants had not yet won or lost a trial, or received a noise blast, thus
minimizing any effect receiving the noise blasts may have had on participants’ capacity for
response inhibition. Participants’ mean response times during the first round of the
Stroop/Tap procedure are presented in Table 1.
Two interference scores were calculated. First, an incongruent-neutral interference
score (I-N interference) was calculated by subtracting participants’ average response time
across neutral stimuli from their response time across incongruent stimuli. This is the most
standard practice for calculating Stroop interference (Macleod, 1991), and it provides a
measure of response inhibition by indicating the decrease in participants’ color-naming
performance when having to inhibit a dominant reading response, compared to their colornaming performance in the absence of a competing response. Second, an incongruentcongruent interference score (I-C interference) was calculated by subtracting participants’
response time across congruent stimuli from their response time across incongruent stimuli. In
this method of calculating interference (Josefsson & Broberg, 2011; Teper & Inzlicht, 2013),
a dominant response pattern (i.e., word-reading) is activated in both conditions, but it is only
detrimental to performance in the incongruent condition. In order to avoid errors and name
colors efficiently across trials, participants must inhibit the dominant word-reading response
each time, including during congruent trials. The I-C interference score provides an estimate
of participants’ response inhibition across trials in which a competing response is activated.
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Procedure

After mass testing, email invitations were issued to eligible participants, inviting them
to participate in the full study. Invitations included a password that granted participants
permission to schedule participation in the study via Sona Systems (Sona Systems, Ltd.,
2014), an online subject-pool management program. Informed consent was obtained both at
mass testing and in the laboratory, prior to participation in laboratory-based tasks (Appendix
D).
Participation in the laboratory took approximately one hour. Participants were seated,
alone, in a quiet room. In order to obtain a baseline estimate of participants’ capacity for
response inhibition, they first completed the Stroop task, independent of the TAP.
Next, participants were randomly assigned to participate in either a mindfulness-based
breathing activity or a control activity. Random assignment was conducted separately for
White and non-White participants in order to ensure a roughly equal number of minority
participants in each group. While mindfulness can be experienced in a variety of formats, the
most common practice for experimentally inducing mindfulness involves guiding participants
to focus their attention on their experience of breathing (e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006;
Broderick, 2005; Erisman & Roemer, 2010; Hooper et al., 2011; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005).
Accordingly, participants in the mindfulness condition listened to an audio recording that
introduced mindfulness and guided them through a 20-minute, non-judgmental, focused
breathing exercise. The introduction and guided breathing exercise (Appendix E) were
adopted from transcripts published by Erisman and Roemer (2010) and Wenk-Sormaz (2005),
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respectively. The exercise was intended to induce a state of mindfulness through the
intentional, non-judgmental focused attention on the present-moment experience of breathing.
Consistent with control conditions included in other mindfulness induction studies
(e.g., Arch & Craske, 2006; Heppner et al., 2008; Hooper et al., 2011; Wenk-Sormaz, 2005),
participants in the control group were asked to sit quietly, allow themselves to relax, and let
their minds wander. However, in order to more closely match the conditions of the
mindfulness induction, the control participants also listened to a 20-minute audio recording in
the form of a selection of classical music.
Following the experimental manipulation, participants completed the combined Stroop
and TAP task. Participants then completed the manipulation check and demographic
questionnaire, which was administered via online survey software. Finally, participants were
given a list of local counseling resources they could use in the event that they experienced
negative psychological outcomes related to participation. In order to preserve the deception in
the TAP, full debriefing was conducted via email at the conclusion of each semester of data
collection.

CHAPTER 3
RESULTS

Data Preparation and Overview of Analyses

No missing data were detected. The TAP data were normally distributed and no
outliers were detected. The response time data were prepared according to recommendations
by Ratcliff (1993, 2013). For every participant, the distributions of response times for each
response time condition (e.g., baseline incongruent Stroop trials, congruent Stroop/TAP trials)
were separately evaluated for outliers. For each of these distributions, response times greater
than two standard deviations above the mean were removed prior to calculating participants’
mean response times for each trial type (i.e., neutral, congruent, and incongruent trials at
baseline and during the Stroop/TAP). Baayen and Milin (2010) suggested that response times
of less than 5 ms after a stimulus is presented are physically impossible, and Luce (1986)
demonstrated that true responses typically require at least 100 ms to perform. Given these
guidelines, one extremely low response time (4 ms) was also removed.
Boxplots and stem-and-leaf charts were used to identify between-subjects outliers for
participants’ mean response times, number of errors, and interference scores. Because
response times for long, spurious responses were removed at the trial level prior to computing
participants’ mean response times for each condition, outlying high mean response times
likely represented participants who genuinely required a long time to respond to the Stroop
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trials. In other words, since long individual trials (e.g., long response times due to distraction)
were removed, high mean response times represent participants who consistently required
more time than most to respond to the Stroop trials. Accordingly, outlying mean response
times were replaced with the nearest non-outlying values in their distributions in order to
reduce their effects on analyses without removing them altogether, which would have
misrepresented group means by unduly lowering them. Likewise, the same procedure was
used for outlying errors and interference scores, thereby reducing the effects of these outliers
without removing them from the data. Participants’ inhibitory control at baseline and during
the first round of the combined Stroop/TAP task are represented by three different scores:
incongruent trial errors, I-N interference, and I-C interference. For Hypotheses 2 through 4,
each score was evaluated in separate analyses.

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 proposed that participants assigned to the mindfulness induction would
behave less aggressively in response to provocation than controls. However, results of an
independent-samples t test indicate that the noise blasts issued by participants in the
mindfulness group (M = 6.29, SD = 2.19) did not differ in intensity from those issued by the
control participants (M = 6.25, SD = 1.97), t(63) = -.06, p = .95, d = -.02.1

1

Analyses were also conducted using participants’ maximum noise blast issued as the dependent variable;
however, results did not differ from those found using participants’ average noise blast score.
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Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2 proposed that participants assigned to the mindfulness condition would
exhibit better response inhibition than those assigned to the control condition, while
controlling for participants’ baseline capacity for response inhibition. A series of one-way
ANCOVAs, in which participants’ response inhibition scores during the combined
Stroop/TAP task (i.e., I-N interference, I-C interference, and incongruent trial errors) were
compared between groups while controlling for their baseline inhibitory control scores. There
were no significant between-groups differences for I-N interference, F(1, 62) = .12, p = .74,
ηp2 < .01, or I-C interference, F(1, 62) = .11, p = .74, ηp2 < .01. Across groups, baseline I-N
interference, F(1, 62) = 5.85, p = .02, ηp2 = .09, and I-C interference, F(1, 62) = 14.18, p <
.001, ηp2 = .19, were significant predictors of Stroop/TAP I-N and I-C interference scores,
respectively. An evaluation of participants’ errors on incongruent Stroop trials revealed that,
across groups, the number of errors participants made at baseline was a significant predictor
of errors made during the combined Stroop/Tap task, F(1, 62) = 11.90, p = .001, ηp2 = .16.
Group was also a significant predictor of errors; however, the effect was in the opposite
direction than expected. Participants in the mindfulness group made more errors on the
incongruent trials than those in the control group, F(1, 62) = 5.52, p = .02, ηp2 = .08 (see
Table 2 for means), when controlling for baseline errors.
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Table 2
Mean Interference Scores, Errors, and Difference Scores by Condition

Baseline I-N interference
ST I-N interference
I-N difference
Baseline I-C interference
ST I-C interference
I-C difference
Baseline incongruent trial errors
ST incongruent trial errors
Error difference

Control
M(SD)
142.03
(94.40)
7.54 (127.41)
134.50 (137.38)
115.73
(81.55)
94.45 (117.52)
21.27 (117.71)
1.11
(1.21)
.40
(.65)
.71
(1.18)

Mindfulness
M(SD)
173.99
(81.28)
30.01 (112.48)
143.98 (113.85)
129.08
(68.44)
94.53 (144.64)
34.55 (121.58)
1.10
(1.45)
.80
(.85)*
.30
(1.29)

Note. * p = .04. Control n = 35; Mindfulness n = 30. ST = Stroop/Tap procedure.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 proposed that participants’ capacity for inhibitory control would predict
aggressive behavior in the context of provocation. To test this hypothesis, a series of
regression analyses were conducted in which participants’ mean noise blast scores were
regressed onto their response inhibition scores from the combined Stroop/TAP task (i.e., I-N
interference, I-C interference, and incongruent trial errors). Results indicated that, across
measures of inhibitory control, participants’ capacity for response inhibition did not
significantly predict TAP scores (see Table 3).2

2

Analyses were also conducted using participants’ maximum noise blast issued as the dependent variable;
however, results did not differ from those found using participants’ average noise blast score.
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Table 3
Standardized and Unstandardized Regression Coefficients for Measures of Inhibitory Control
as Predictors of Aggression

I-N interference
I-C interference
Incongruent trial errors

b
<.001
-.002
-.28

SE b
.002
.002
.34

ß
-.03
-.10
-.11

Note. I-N interference: R2 = .001, F (1, 63) = .05, p = .82. I-C interference: R2 = .01, F (1, 63) = .58, p = .45.
Incongruent trial errors: R2 = .01, F (1, 63) = .70, p = .41.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 proposed that between-groups differences (i.e., mindfulness versus
control) in response inhibition following the mindfulness induction would mediate the
relationship between laboratory-induced mindfulness (compared to a control condition) and
aggressive behavior. A bias-corrected bootstrap resampling technique via the statistics macro
PROCESS (Hayes, 2013) was used to test the significance of the indirect effects of response
inhibition (e.g., I-N interference, I-C interference, and incongruent trial errors) on the
relationship between condition (mindfulness or control) and noise blast intensity. In
accordance with Mallinckrodt, Abraham, Wei, and Russell’s (2006) recommendations, ten
thousand bootstrap resamples were conducted and used to test the indirect effects. Estimates
of the impact of the indirect effect were insignificant for all three models, as indicated by the
presence of zero in the 95% confidence intervals of the bootstrap estimate of each effect (see
Table 4). Unstandardized coefficients of each path are presented in Figure 1.
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Table 4
Mediation Analyses for Evaluating the Indirect Effect of Response Inhibition on the
Relationship Between Mindfulness and Aggression
Mediator
I-N interference
I-C interference
Incongruent trial errors

Boot
-.01
.02
-.12

SE
.07
.08
.16

CI
-.20 – .11
-.09 – .31
-.53 – .13

Note. SE = standard error. CI = confidence interval.

Research Question

In order to determine whether mindful and control participants responded to increasing
levels of provocation differently, a two-way repeated-measures ANOVA was conducted,
comparing the aggression of the two groups (mindfulness and control) at each level of
provocation (low, moderate, and high). Consistent with prior studies, the main effect of
provocation was significant, F(2, 126) = 17.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .22, meaning that the intensity
of noise blasts issued by participants varied based on level of provocation. The main effect of
condition was not significant; noise blasts issued by participants in the mindfulness group did
not differ significantly from those issued by controls across levels of provocation, F(1, 63) =
.01, p = .92, ηp2 < .001. Further, the interaction between condition and provocation was not
significant, F(2, 126) = .31, p = .73, ηp2 = .01, indicating that the mindful and control groups
responded similarly to the effects of provocation.
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Figure 1. Unstandardized Beta Coefficients for Paths in Analyses of the Indirect Effects of
Measures of Inhibitory Control on the Effect of Mindfulness on Aggression. *p = .02.

CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION

This study evaluated whether a single, brief mindfulness induction would have
immediate, state-based effects on aggressive behavior and whether, if present, such effects
would be partially explained by mindfulness-induced changes in inhibitory control. A
focused breathing exercise was used to induce mindfulness in a sample of mindfulness-naive
male undergraduates, whose performances on an inhibitory control task and aggression
paradigm were then compared to that of a control group.
Mindfulness-based interventions have been repeatedly linked to reductions in
aggressive behavior (e.g., Chapman et al., 2013, Fix & Fix, 2013; Samuelson et al., 2007),
presumably due to increases in trait mindfulness. However, trait mindfulness is difficult to
assess and mindfulness-based interventions include many active components, making it
difficult to determine whether increased mindfulness has a direct effect on reductions in
aggression. Heppner and colleagues (2008) conducted the first known study in which
aggressive behavior was assessed following an experimental manipulation of state
mindfulness. They found that participants who completed a mindfulness induction behaved
less aggressively than those who did not participate in the induction, suggesting that state
mindfulness has a direct effect on aggressive behavior. Further, Heppner and colleagues’
(2008) results suggest that just one experience with mindfulness can have immediate effects
on aggressive behavior among those with no prior mindfulness experience.

73
However, in contrast to Heppner et al.’s (2008) findings and Hypothesis 1, results in
the present study indicated that participants assigned to the mindfulness group were no more,
or less, aggressive than controls, suggesting that the mindfulness induction did not impact
participants’ propensity for aggressive behavior in response to provocation. Thus, either
mindfulness was not effectively induced, or it had no impact on aggressive behavior in the
present study. It may be that the focused breathing exercise was not effective at inducing
mindfulness in this sample or that other factors (e.g., participant stress) interfered with their
ability to be mindful. On the other hand, it may be that participants did not experience
mindfulness because, contrary to what Heppner and colleagues’ (2008) findings suggest, it
cannot be meaningfully induced during a brief, one-time experience. Finally, it may be that
mindfulness was successfully induced in one or both of these studies but that mindfulness
does not impact aggressive behavior without additional training and practice. Such an
argument supports the idea that repeated mindfulness practice causes an increase in trait
mindfulness, and it is this trait-based change that ultimately impacts behavior (e.g.,
Samuelson et al., 2007).
It is important to note a key limitation in both Heppner and colleagues’ (2008) study
and the present research. Due to a lack of available measures for assessing state mindfulness
(Tanay & Bernstein, 2013), neither study included a manipulation check to assess whether
mindfulness had actually been induced as a result of the procedure. Instead, both relied on a
control-group comparison to identify the effects of a standard mindfulness induction and
assumed that such effects would be due to the experience of state mindfulness. However,
when taking this approach, it is important that the experience of participants in the control
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condition be as closely matched to that of the mindfulness condition as possible. Accordingly,
the control participants in the present study completed an activity that was similar to those in
the mindfulness group (i.e., participants in both groups listened to a 20-minute recording in
the same quiet room), but it did not include key elements of a mindfulness induction (i.e.,
focused attention). In contrast, the experience of the mindfulness and control participants in
Heppner and colleagues’ (2008) study was very different. The raisin-eating task that they used
for a mindfulness induction was directive and active, whereas their control participants simply
waited quietly and did not participate in any additional activity. The lack of similarity
between the mindfulness and control groups participants’ experience is especially relevant
because, unlike the present study, the participants in Heppner and colleagues’ (2008) study
were provoked before the mindfulness induction, not after it. In Heppner and colleagues’
(2008) study, participants experienced a social rejection prior to the mindfulness induction,
following which they were given the opportunity to behave aggressively on the TAP, toward
those who had rejected them. Thus, the activity that preceded the social rejection (i.e., waiting
or doing the raisin eating task) would have influenced how they processed the experience of
being rejected. Heppner and colleagues (2008) argued that the mindfulness induction
mitigated the distress participants experienced as a result of the rejection, which then lessened
their propensity to behave aggressively toward those who rejected them. However, it is
important to consider the effect waiting quietly had on the control participants. During the 20minute quiet wait period, participants would have had the opportunity to ruminate about the
rejection, potentially increasing their experience of distress, as well as their desire to behave
aggressively toward those who rejected them. Thus, the two groups may have differed
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because the control participants’ propensity to behave aggressively increased, rather than
because the mindfulness induction had a mitigating effect on aggression.
Hypothesis 2, which proposed that mindfulness would be associated with better
response inhibition, was not supported. Specifically, participants’ interference scores,
calculated based on their response time during the first block of the Stroop portion of the
TAP, did not differ between groups, indicating that the mindfulness induction did not produce
the predicted improvement in participants’ ability to inhibit word-reading behavior in favor of
color-naming. Interestingly, despite random group assignment, participants in the mindfulness
group exhibited poorer response inhibition compared to controls at baseline. This finding
emphasizes the importance of controlling for pre-existing group differences; if baseline
interference had not been included as a control, between-groups differences may have been
found and erroneously attributed to the effects of the mindfulness induction.
ANCOVAs are useful for evaluating between-groups differences in treatment effects
while controlling for baseline functioning, but ANCOVAs and descriptive statistics alone do
little to illustrate the magnitude of treatment effects. To better understand the magnitude of
between-groups differences, participants’ mean interference scores can be used to calculate
difference scores (i.e., baseline interference – Stroop/TAP interference; see Table 2). These
demonstrate that for both I-N and I-C interferences the mindfulness group exhibited greater
improvement following the induction than the control group. These differences are not
significant (I-N interference, t(63) = -.30, p = .77, d = .08; I-C interference, t(63) = -.45, p =
.66, d = .11), but they show that the effect of the mindfulness intervention was in the
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predicted direction, even though participants in the mindfulness group experienced more
interference than controls both at baseline and during the TAP.
In contrast to the null findings with regard to interference, the errors made by the
mindfulness and control groups differed significantly, in the opposite direction of what was
expected. Participants in the mindfulness group made more incongruent trial errors than
controls during the Stroop/TAP task, controlling for incongruent trial errors during the
baseline assessment of the Stroop. Consistent with this, difference scores for incongruent trial
errors show that the control group experienced greater reduction in the number of errors
committed from pre- to post-test. This difference is also not statistically significant (t(63) =
1.35, p = .18), though the effect size (d = .33) suggests it may be meaningful.
Does this difference in error rate suggest that the mindfulness condition was actually
harmful to participants’ inhibitory control? To answer this question, it is important to
understand what Stroop trial errors are thought to represent. On incongruent trials, an error is
typically the result of reading the word (e.g., “blue”) instead of naming the ink color the word
is printed in (e.g., red ink). Incongruent trial errors serve as a measure of response inhibition
because they represent the ability to inhibit word reading in favor of color naming. In contrast,
congruent and neutral trials do not require that a dominant response (i.e., word reading) be
inhibited, so errors on these trials are not attributed to poor inhibitory control. Accordingly,
the mindfulness group’s higher error rate on the incongruent trials should only be attributed to
poorer response inhibition if the groups’ error rates differ only on incongruent trials, and do
not differ on neutral and congruent trials. If the mindfulness group also made more errors on
other trials which are not typically indicators of problems with inhibition, then their errors
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might be better attributed to other factors (e.g., carelessness or rushing). Follow-up testing of
congruent and neutral trial error rates between groups suggest that this was the case in the
present study. Participants in the mindfulness group (M = .37, SD = .49) also made more
congruent-trial errors than controls (M = .14, SD = .36), F(1, 62) = 4.51, p = .04, ηp2 = .07,
when controlling for baseline congruent trial errors. Mindfulness participants (M = .47, SD =
.73) and controls (M = .57, SD = .70) did not differ significantly in the number of errors made
on neutral trials, F(1, 62) = .34, p = .56, ηp2 = .01. Thus, because the mindfulness group’s
increased error rate was not limited to the incongruent trials, it would be inappropriate to
conclude that the between-groups difference is due to differences in response inhibition.
What might have caused the mindfulness group to make more errors overall? One
possibility is that the inherent difficulty in complying with the instructions of the mindfulness
induction (i.e., maintain focus on your breath) depleted their feelings of self-efficacy and left
them feeling stressed or anxious, which then carried over to their participation in the
Stroop/TAP task, resulting in more errors. To evaluate this possibility, participants’ responses
to the manipulation check question, “How much anxiety/distress did you feel during the
competition?” were assessed. Results indicated that the level of anxiety/distress self-reported
by participants in the mindfulness group (M = 2.80, SD = 1.58) was actually lower than the
anxiety/distress reported by controls (M = 3.43, SD = 1.50). This difference approaches a
trend, t(63) = 1.64, p = .11, and the effect size suggests that the difference is meaningful, d =
.41. Thus, the mindfulness induction does not appear to have contributed to errors via
increased distress. In fact, the results are more in line with the opposite. Consistent with the
Yerkes-Dodson law, it is possible that the mindfulness participants’ stress level was too low
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for them to perform their best, whereas the control groups slightly higher experience of stress
may have helped them minimize errors.
Another possibility is that participants in the mindfulness group were dedicating
cognitive resources to being mindful, which then resulted in them having a higher cognitive
load than controls. If this were the case, then maintaining mindfulness and completing the
Stroop/Tap task would have been competing for cognitive resources and could have left the
mindfulness participants at a disadvantage over the controls. Speculations can be made, but
there is no obvious explanation for why participants in the mindfulness group made more
errors than controls. Further, because this effect is in the opposite direction than theory would
suggest, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the mindfulness induction was responsible
for this difference unless these findings were to replicate in future studies. Rather, it is more
likely that there was some other unidentified difference between the groups, despite
randomization, that was responsible for the higher error rate among participants in the
mindfulness group.
In contrast to prior research and Hypothesis 3, the non-significant relationships
between interference scores on the Stroop/TAP and noise blasts issued on the TAP suggest
that response inhibition was not related to aggressive behavior in the present study. However,
prior research that has identified such associations has been conducted almost exclusively
with antisocial samples (e.g., violent criminals: Broomhall, 2005; Fishbein, 2000; IPV
perpetrators: Cohen et al., 2003; Westby & Ferraro, 1999). Thus, it may be that response
inhibition deficits are characteristic of highly aggressive individuals, and associations between
response inhibition and more mild aggression are not present in the general population.
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Given this possibility, an aggressive subsample of undergraduates was sought for the
present study. The short form of the AQ (Bryant & Smith, 2001) has not been used frequently
in published research; therefore, it is difficult to determine how the level of aggressiveness
reported in the present study compares to aggression reported by antisocial individuals and
those in the general population. In the present study, the mean AQ-SF physical aggression
subscale score from the overall male undergraduate sample surveyed during mass testing was
7.05. This score is consistent with an average AQ-SF physical aggression subscale of 7.60
reported by Hornsveld, Muris, Kraaimaat, and Meesters (2009) for a sample of Dutch male
adolescents. Further, for the final sample in the present study, the mean AQ-SF physical
aggression subscale score was 10.91, which is higher than the scores of 8.58 and 9.31 that
Hornsveld et al. (2009) reported for inpatient and outpatient violent male offenders,
respectively. This suggests that aggression reported in the present sample is comparable to the
aggression reported by violent offenders, despite the sample being drawn from an
undergraduate population. Thus, the failure to find significant associations between response
inhibition and aggressive behavior in the present sample should not be attributed specifically
to low levels of trait aggression.
However, there are many factors other than aggression (e.g., socioeconomic status, life
stress) that distinguishes the undergraduate sample in the present study from the antisocial
samples in prior research. It may be that these factors affect participants’ baseline levels of
inhibitory control or moderate the relationship between response inhibition and aggressive
behavior. Alternatively, aggression may only be associated with response inhibition when it is
poor, whereas at high levels of inhibitory control, variations in aggressive behavior are
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attributable to other factors. If this were the case, and if undergraduates were found to have
generally better response inhibition than antisocial individuals, it could explain the failure to
replicate the association between inhibitory control and aggression in the present study,
despite similar levels of aggressiveness.
Most prior research has found that trait-aggressive individuals have less inhibitory
control than non-aggressive individuals regardless of whether provocation is present (e.g.,
Cohen et al., 2003; Westby & Ferraro, 1999). However, in one of the only known studies that
evaluated the association between aggression and response inhibition in a general population
sample, Denny and Seimer (2012) found that higher trait aggression was associated with
poorer response inhibition in the context of provocation, but it was unrelated when response
inhibition was measured in response to non-provoking stimuli. In the present study, the
measure of response inhibition was drawn from the first block of Stroop trials completed
during the Stroop/TAP, which participants completed prior to receiving the provoking noise
blasts. Thus, consistent with Denny and Seimer’s (2012) findings, it might be that interference
scores were unrelated to aggressive behavior because the participants were not provoked.
However, follow-up analyses of participants’ Stroop performance during the high-provocation
rounds of the TAP suggest that this was not the case. There was not a significant correlation
between noise blast intensity issued during the high-provocation rounds and participants’ I-N
interference scores, r(65) = .12, p = .33, or I-C interference scores, r(65) = .10, p = .44, for
Stroop trials completed during high-provocation rounds. Hence, even in the context of strong
provocation, participants’ inhibitory control was unrelated to their aggressive behavior in the
present study.
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Finally, it is important to note that the present research is the first of its kind to
evaluate the association between response inhibition and aggression in which both are
assessed behaviorally in the laboratory. A few studies have found that more problems with
executive functioning predict greater aggression on the TAP; however, these studies did not
evaluate inhibitory control specifically (Giancola & Zeichner, 1994). Prior research linking
inhibitory control and aggression has relied on self-report measures of trait aggression or
criminal history (e.g., Denny & Siemer, 2012; Pawlizcek et al., 2013), rather than assessing
aggressive behavior with a laboratory analog measure, such as the TAP. Accordingly, this is
the first known study able to assess whether inhibitory control capacity predicts aggressive
behavior. The fact that participants’ performance across measures of response inhibition did
not predict the level of aggression they engaged in on the TAP suggests that, while there may
be associations between aggression and inhibitory control (e.g., violent criminals often have
poor executive functioning), response inhibition may not be a direct predictor of aggressive
behavior.
Some interesting patterns emerged when examining the Stroop/TAP data. First, for
both groups, Stroop/TAP I-C interference scores (i.e., participants’ average response time on
incongruent Stroop trials minus their average response time on congruent trials) were higher
than Stroop/TAP I-N interference scores (i.e., incongruent response time minus neutral
response time). Typically, participants complete neutral trials (i.e., Xs printed in colored ink)
the fastest, followed by congruent trials (e.g., “red” in red ink), with incongruent trials (e.g.,
‘red” in blue ink) requiring the longest time to respond to (Macleod, 1991). Accordingly, I-N
interference scores are typically higher than I-C interference scores. This typical pattern is
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what was found for participants’ baseline interference scores. However, during the
Stroop/TAP, participants completed the congruent trials more quickly than the neutral trials,
resulting in higher I-C interference scores. This is known as a facilitation effect (Macleod,
1991). In this case, having the matching word for the color (e.g., “red”) presented along with
the color (e.g., red ink) enhances the ability to quickly identify the color of the ink, perhaps
through a priming effect. Theories differ as to how the Stroop task is processed (Macleod,
1991); however, some argue that participants read the word automatically and then must
consciously choose to identify the ink color. In this case, when the word matches the ink
color, participants are primed for the ink color, making naming it easier than if they had seen
Xs and then had to identify their ink color without being primed by the word. While the
facilitation effect is noteworthy, it is important to recognize that, because it was found across
groups, it does not impact the validity of conclusions regarding the effect of the mindfulness
induction.
Another interesting pattern in the Stroop/TAP data was that a large number of
participants had negative I-N interference scores (n = 31) and I-C interference scores (n = 17)
for the first block of the Stroop/TAP. Negative scores were also found at baseline (I-N
interference, n = 3; I-C interference, n = 1), but the quantity was much fewer and less unusual.
Participants have negative interference scores when their average response time on
incongruent Stroop trials is faster than on congruent or neutral trials. While some atypical data
is to be expected (i.e., the four negative baseline interference scores), the fact that almost half
of the I-N interference scores and more than a quarter of the I-C interference scores for the
Stroop/TAP were negative is highly unusual. This is inconsistent with data typically obtained
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from the Stroop task and the theory behind it (Macleod, 1991) and suggests that the Stroop
data may not be valid. However, it may be that the 10 trials of each type, included in the first
block of the Stroop, were not enough to provide sufficient data for obtaining a reliable
estimate of participants’ response inhibition.
To evaluate this possibility, interference scores were calculated using all of the
Stroop/TAP trials (i.e., data from each round of the TAP). When all the trials were included,
there were only two negative I-N interference scores and two negative I-C interference scores.
This indicates that, across the entire Stroop/TAP procedure, the Stroop operated as expected.
Thus, the interference scores calculated based on the first Stroop/TAP block might simply not
be representative of participants’ overall Stroop performance. However, when analyses were
re-run with these overall Stroop/TAP interference scores, the conclusions did not change.
Therefore, while the interference scores calculated using only the first block of the
Stroop/TAP may not be reliable estimates of participants’ inhibitory control, it appears that
the conclusions drawn regarding the absence of a relationship between response inhibition
and aggressive behavior in the present study are valid.
Hypothesis 4 proposed that inhibitory control would mediate the relationship between
mindfulness and aggression. Given that the predicted relationships between mindfulness and
aggression, mindfulness and response inhibition, and response inhibition and aggression were
not significant, it is not surprising that the models of the indirect effects were also nonsignificant. Of note, in two of the models (I-N interference and incongruent trial errors as
mediators), the direct effect (c’) was larger than the total effect (c). The c paths were also
opposite in sign (positive) to the indirect effect (ab was negative). As a result, when the
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indirect effects were subtracted from the total effect (i.e., c – -ab = c’), the remaining direct
effects were larger than the total effect. Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) refer to this as
inconsistent mediation, which may indicate a suppression effect. In this case, the inconsistent
mediation occurred because the unstandardized regression coefficients for the relationships
between response inhibition and TAP scores were negative, despite their correlations being
positive. As a result, the indirect effects (ab) for the I-N interference and incongruent trial
error models are negative while the c paths are positive. However, because the main effects in
the mediation models were not significant (except the case of the mindfulness group making
significantly more errors than controls) and a mediation effect would not be expected, the
presence or absence of a suppression effect is not of interest.
The research question explored whether participants in the mindfulness group would
respond differently than the controls to increases in provocation. Participants typically
respond to increasing provocation during the TAP (i.e., receiving increasingly loud noise
blasts) by issuing increasingly loud noise blasts to their opponent, as was the case for
participants in both groups for the present study. However, given the mindset of nonjudgment and acceptance cultivated by mindfulness practice, it was thought that participants
in the mindfulness group might have been less impacted by the increasing provocation and
consequently might not have exhibited the increase in retaliatory noise blast volume that is
typically observed. Yet, given the lack of differences in overall aggressive behavior between
groups, it is not surprising that there was not a significant interaction between group and level
of provocation.
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In summary, for each hypothesis made, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The
only significant finding was that participants in the mindfulness group made more errors on
the Stroop task than controls; however, this finding was in the opposite direction, as was
expected, and was not consistent with results for the other assessments of inhibitory control
(i.e., I-N and I-C interference). Together, these findings indicate that the associations found
between mindfulness, response inhibition, and aggression in prior research were not replicated
in the present study.
However, it is important to acknowledge the many differences between the samples,
study designs, and hypotheses in existing research compared to those in the present study. For
one, the present study utilized a more general sample than the specific samples (e.g.,
offenders and meditators) used in most of the reviewed studies. Further, the present study
assessed for mindfulness-based effects after a single mindfulness induction with mindfulnessnaïve participants, whereas the majority of prior research looked at aggression and response
inhibition among those who were very experienced with mindfulness. Finally, much of the
reviewed research has focused on inhibitory control as it relates to trait aggression and
mindfulness, rather than as it relates to aggressive behavior and state mindfulness, which was
the focus of the present research. Thus, the present findings suggest that the relationships
between mindfulness, response inhibition and aggression identified in the extant research may
not generalize across populations. Rather, they may only be valid in the context of extensive
mindfulness practice and trait-based increases in mindfulness, and mindfulness may be most
effective at reducing aggression for those who exhibit highly aggressive behavior. Thus, it
may be more appropriate for future research to evaluate response inhibition as a mechanism
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for the relationship between mindfulness and aggression in the context of treatment study of
mindfulness-based interventions for violent behavior.
Limitations in the present study must be considered. First, the present study was
underpowered, and small group sizes limit the power to detect true effects. However, given
the absence of effects in this study, it is unlikely that having a larger sample would have
changed outcomes. The study is further limited by participants’ low confidence that they
were competing against a real opponent during the TAP, which suggests that the deception
and provocation may not have been successful, thus threatening the internal validity of the
study. If participants did not actually experience the TAP tasks as provoking, their noise blast
scores may not be a valid indicator of their aggressive behavior, which limits the ability to
draw conclusions regarding the way mindfulness and response inhibition impact aggressive
behavior in the context of provocation. As discussed previously, there is also some concern
that the first block of the Stroop portion of the Stroop/TAP did not operate as expected;
however, results did not differ when analyses were conducted using all of the data from the
Stroop/TAP.
An additional limitation is that, as noted above, one of the screening measures used to
determine participant eligibility did not perform as expected, which suggests another threat to
the internal validity of the study. Specifically, the alpha level of the AQ-SF physical
aggression subscale (Bryant & Smith, 2001) was very poor (α = .08), indicating that the three
items included in the subscale were not measuring the same underlying construct. Thus, it
may be that participants’ subscale scores may not have been a valid indicator of their trait
aggression. This would support the conclusion that results were not found, in part, because
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mindfulness only reduces aggressive behavior for those who are highly trait aggressive.
However, it should be noted that the items included in the AQ-SF physical aggression
subscale ask specifically about how characteristic different aggressive behaviors are of the
respondent, making it more a measure of observable aggressive behavior than of an
underlying construct of trait aggression. Thus, the fact that the scale had poor internal
consistency does not change the fact that men who scored higher were identifying more
strongly with aggressive behaviors, indicating that the poor subscale internal consistency is
likely not the reason why significant findings were not identified. .
Finally, perhaps the biggest limitation in the present research is the inability to
determine whether findings from prior research were not replicated because they do not
generalize to the specific context of this study (i.e., mindfulness-naïve participants, aggressive
behavior rather than trait aggression, response inhibition as opposed to executive functioning
more generally) or rather because the mindfulness induction simply was not effective. A brief,
one-time induction of mindfulness was chosen for the present research in order to attempt to
isolate the specific effects of mindfulness from other outcomes of mindfulness-based
treatment; however, one exposure to mindfulness may not have been sufficient for any
mindfulness-based effects to manifest. The specific procedure for inducing mindfulness in the
present study may also have been problematic. Participants may have been more able to
follow along with the instructions and access a state of mindfulness if the focused breathing
exercise had been led by an instructor in the room with them, rather than administered via a
recording.
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Typically, manipulation checks are used to determine whether any type of induction is
successful. However, there has been widespread disagreement regarding how to assess
mindfulness (Chiesa, 2012), and assessing state mindfulness has been particularly problematic
(Tanay & Bernstein, 2013). The Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 1995) has been
widely criticized because it measures decentering and curiosity, which are not core
components of mindfulness (Tanay & Bernstein, 2013). Further, the TMS is designed to
assess state mindfulness specifically in experienced participants. The State Mindfulness Scale,
which has shown promise in its initial validation studies, had only been validated in Hebrew
in an Israeli sample at the time data was collected in the present study (Tanay & Bernstein,
2013). Valid and reliable assessments of state mindfulness are critical to the quality of future
research on the effects of state mindfulness and their development should be a priority in
mindfulness research.
An important strength of the present research is its experimental design. Established
associations between mindfulness and response inhibition are primarily based on correlational
data, and no prior research had assessed the effect mindfulness has on response inhibition and
then evaluated response inhibition as a predictor of aggressive behavior. Instead, the
relationship between response inhibition and aggressive behavior has been established
through studies where trait aggression and violent offending has been used to predict
inhibitory control. This suggests that aggressive behavior may be characterized by poor
response inhibition but does nothing to establish causality. To address these issues, the present
study used an experimental design to assess the impact mindfulness has on inhibitory control
and then evaluate their effects on aggression. Results indicated that, in this study, mindfulness
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did not predict response inhibition, and neither predicted aggressive behavior. Thus, while
poor inhibitory control is common among aggressive individuals and violent offenders,
decreased inhibitory control may not be causing their aggressive behavior. Further, more
research is needed to determine the amount of mindfulness training necessary for outcomes
commonly attributed to mindfulness to be observed.
Neither prior research nor the present study can fully answer the questions of whether
increases in trait mindfulness are independently capable of improving inhibitory control
and/or decreasing aggression, as well as whether these effects are more robust when a mindful
state is cultivated. That is, maybe state mindfulness does have unique effects on response
inhibition and aggressive behavior, but a level of trait mindfulness is required for participants
to access a mindful state and experience these outcomes. Future research might evaluate these
questions using an experimental design similar to the one employed in the present study, but
modified to include several sessions of mindfulness training for participants prior to random
assignment to a mindfulness induction or control procedure and the assessment of state-based
effects. With a design that includes mindfulness-naïve controls, trait-mindful controls, and a
mindfulness induction group that has had prior mindfulness training, researchers could
evaluate the state-based effects of mindfulness following an induction in a sample that would
be more likely to access a mindful state, given their prior exposure.
Mindfulness is in the zeitgeist, reaching far beyond mental health treatments. It has
been applied in schools, government, athletics, and big business. Its explosive growth is
largely due to the positive impact those who have adopted mindfulness have experienced in
their own lives. When mindfulness is embraced as a way of living, true transformation in the
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way one experiences the world can occur. At its core, living mindfully is about treasuring the
here and now and allowing judgment, worry, and psychological pain to fall away. It is easy to
see ways in which the ripple effects of mindfulness may be endless.
The question is, can mindfulness stand the test of time? And is it the panacea it has
been billed as? The answers to both questions will depend on what quality research can teach
us about the way mindfulness operates and the direct effects it has on the human experience.
How do we operationalize mindfulness for research? What is the required dose for effects?
What direct effects does it have, and what apparent outcomes work through indirect
processes? Does it work for some better than others? And if so, what qualities determine its
differential effects? When the fervor over mindfulness dies down, it will be research that
determines whether mindfulness is worthy of all the excitement it has generated and whether
it will become a more permanent part of our culture or be relegated to a passing fad. The
present research explored some of these questions by attempting to isolate the effects of
mindfulness from other associated outcomes and evaluating its effectiveness with a single
dose. One may conclude that the absence of relationships between mindfulness and aggressive
behavior is evidence that the effects of mindfulness are not as global as they are claimed to be
and its effects are more nuanced than is typically acknowledged. However, another equally
plausible and possibly incompatible conclusion is that mindfulness is a skill that must be
practiced and honed before true change can occur and simply trying mindfulness for a first
time may not provide the exposure necessary for its effects to be present. A great deal more
research is necessary to fully understand mindfulness and the nature of the impact it has on
executive functioning and aggression.
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Aggression Questionnaire, Short Form
Instructions: Please read the following statements and use the scale to indicate how
characteristic each statement is of you.

1
Extremely
uncharacteristic
of me

2

3

4

1. I often find myself disagreeing with people.
2. At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life.
3. I have threatened people I know.
4. I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things.
5. I have trouble controlling my temper.
6. My friends say that I'm somewhat argumentative.
7. I flare up quickly but get over it quickly.
8. Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.
9. I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with me.
10. Other people always seem to get the breaks.
11. There are people who pushed me so far that we came to blows.
12. Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason.

5

6
Extremely
characteristic
of me
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Demographic Questionnaire
Instructions: Please answer the following demographic questions about yourself.
1. What is your age? ____
2. How would you classify yourself?
___ African/African American
___ Caucasian
___ Hispanic/Latino(a)
___ East Asian/Asian American
___ Native American Indian
___ Pacific Islander
___ Indian
___ Multiracial or other Please Specify _______________

3. What is the approximate annual income of your family of origin (e.g., your parents
combined income)?
___ Below $20,000
___ $20,000-$40,000
___ $40,000-$60,000
___ $60,000-$80,000
___ $80,000-$100,000
___ $100,000-$150,000
___ Over $150,000
4. How many semesters of college have you completed? (If this is your first semester,
please enter ‘0’) _______
5. As far as you know, have you ever received any of the following therapies or
participated in the following activities: (check all that apply)
__ Mindfulness-based Stress Reduction
__ Mindfulness-based Cognitive Therapy
__ Acceptance and Commitment Therapy
__ Dialectical Behavior Therapy
__ Any other therapy in which mindfulness or meditation skills were taught
__ None of the above
6. Have you ever participated in either of the following activities?
__ Meditation - If yes, please indicate how often you meditate (either currently or in
the past)
__ Yoga - If yes, please indicate how often you have practiced yoga (either currently
or in the past)
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Manipulation Check Questionnaire
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the 20-minute audio-recording.
Your answers will not affect your credits for the experiment, nor will they be seen by anyone
other than the experimenter. It is important that you answer as honestly as possible.
1. How much were you paying attention to the recording?
Not at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – Very much

2. Is there anything that you believe that may have negatively impacted your ability to fully
benefit from the exercise? For example, are you feeling especially stressed, distracted, or
ill? If so, please describe:
________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS? Please provide below.
________________________________________________________________________
Additional questions to be given only to participants in the mindfulness group (to be included
between questions 1 and 2):
1. How much did you attempt to follow the directions in the recording?
Not at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – Very much

2. How much of the time do you think you were actually focused on your breathing during the
exercise?
None at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – 100% of the time

3. Please indicate your agreement with the following statements:
3a. When I realized my mind was wandering and I was no longer focused on my
breathing, I recognized that mind wandering will happen and simply returned my
attention to my breathing.
Not true at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 – Completely true

3b. When I realized my mind was wandering, I was irritated with myself for becoming
distracted and not being able to focus on my breathing as the recording instructed.
Not true at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7 8 – Completely true
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3. Had you heard of mindfulness or practiced it in the past prior to completing the exercise? If
so, please briefly describe your prior exposure to mindfulness:
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about the second color-naming task.
Again, your answers will not affect your credits for the experiment, nor will they be seen by
anyone other than the experimenter. It is important that you answer as honestly as possible.
1. Did the competition impact your color naming ability? If so, how?
________________________________________________________________________
2. Did receiving the noise blasts impact your color naming ability? If so, how?
________________________________________________________________________
3. How much anxiety/distress did you feel during the competition?
None at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – Very much

4. How angry did you feel during the competition?
Not at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – Very much

5. What do you believe was the sex of your opponent?
Male

Female

Don’t Know

6. How confident were you that you were competing against a “real” opponent?
Not at all – 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 – Very much

7. Did you know anything about this experiment before you participated? If so, please
describe what you knew.
________________________________________________________________________
ADDITIONAL COMMENTS? Please provide below.
________________________________________________________________________
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Informed Consent
I agree to participate in the research project titled “State of Mind Effects on Reaction Time” being
conducted by Kristen Thompson, MA, a graduate student in the clinical psychology program at
Northern Illinois University (NIU), under the supervision of Alan Rosenbaum, Ph.D., a faculty
member of NIU’s psychology department. I have been informed that the purpose of this study is to
gather information about the effects of state of mind on reaction time.
I understand that I will be asked to complete two short tasks and then I will be asked to relax while
listening to an audio recording. I will then be asked to participate in a competitive reaction-time task
against an opponent, whose identity will not be revealed to me. I understand that the reaction-time task
will involve a series of reaction time trials in which noise blasts will be received by the losing player.
Before each trial of the game, I will select a noise blast for my opponent, and my opponent will select
a noise blast for me. Upon the completion of each game trial, the losing player will receive the noise
blast chosen by the winning player. Finally, I will be asked to complete a series of short surveys. I
understand that participation in this study is estimated to take about 1 hour.
I am aware that my participation is voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without penalty or
prejudice. If I have any additional questions concerning this study, I may contact Dr. Rosenbaum at
(815) 753-9306. If I would like further information regarding my rights as a research participant, I
may contact the NIU Office of Research Compliance at (815) 753-8588.
I understand that the intended benefits of this study include the ability to contribute to research and to
gain exposure to the research process. I understand that I will also benefit from participating in this
study by receiving course credit, which is one way of completing the research requirement for
Psychology 102 at NIU.
I have been informed that the potential risks/discomforts I could experience during this study are
minimal and include possible discomfort associated with the noise blasts. The maximum noise blast
that either my opponent or I could receive is 100 decibels, which is the equivalent of a large orchestra.
I understand that all information gathered during this experiment will be kept anonymous by the
separation of this consent form from the rest of my questionnaire materials. I also understand that all
data collected will be kept in files in a locked cabinet and on a computer inside a locked laboratory.
I understand that Northern Illinois University policy does not provide for compensation for, nor does
the University carry insurance to cover physical injury or illness suffered as a result of participation in
University sponsored research projects.
I understand that my informed consent to participate in this project does not constitute a waiver of any
legal rights, and I acknowledge that I have received a copy of this consent form.

________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Subject
Date

________________________________________________________________________
Signature of Witness
Date
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Focused Breathing Transcript
In a few moments, I’m going to ask you to think about, and try, a particular kind of
awareness, called mindfulness. Mindfulness is paying attention in the present moment, with
openness and curiosity, instead of judgment. It is about knowing exactly what we are doing,
as we are doing it. We often focus on things other than what is happening in the moment –
worrying about the future, thinking about the past, focusing on what is coming next rather
than what is right in front of us. And it is useful that we can do a number of things without
paying attention to them. However, sometimes it is helpful to bring our attention, particularly
a curious and kind attention, to what we are doing in the moment. I am going to ask you to
direct this kind of attention to your breath and your experience of breathing. I will walk you
through, step by step, what you need to do to cultivate this kind of attention.
Come now to a comfortable sitting position in your chair with your spine erect but not
strained, maintaining a thought of your spine and your torso coming up out of the hip joints
all the way through your neck and your head, and your head, being light and floating gently at
the top of your spine. You may wish to close your eyes or lower your eyelids. Take a moment
now to locate the place in your body where you can feel your own breathing the most clearly
and the most easily. This might be in your nostrils, where you notice the air passing in and out
or perhaps your chest that rises and falls slightly with your inhalation and your exhalation. Or
maybe your belly, your lower abdomen, where there are slight movements with the rhythm of
your breathing. Wherever it may be, bringing your attention now to this place and noticing
your in-breath and out-breath.
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Do not try to change your breathing in any way, or to manipulate your breathing, or
control your breathing. Rather, just observe your own breathing. Befriending your breath,
bringing your awareness right up close to your breath and following the in-breath from its
beginning to its end and following the out-breath from beginning to end. Bringing your full
attention to your breathing, knowing that your breath is an anchor to the present moment, a
way for you to be in touch with your experience in the present moment by moment. Noticing
the in-breath and the out-breath, as one follows the next. Following the in-breath for the entire
length of its duration. Perhaps even noticing a slight pause at the end of the exhalation, just
before your body starts to breathe in its next breath. And staying in touch, in this way, breath
by breath, moment by moment.
You may notice from time to time that your mind is wandering, that you are no longer
with your breathing, but that your mind is lost in thought. Understand when this happens that
it is the nature of the mind to wander. It’s the habit of the mind to look for distractions. And
without criticizing yourself or your mind, without judgment, when you notice that your mind
is wandering, simply note – it’s the wandering mind – and then gently and with great care,
invite your mind to return to your next breath. Bringing your awareness and your full
attention to the next breath, and continuing to follow your breathing. Each time that you
notice that your mind is wandering, there is no need to get caught up in the content of the
thoughts, in the plot or the story line. Simply notice that you are thinking, that you are no
longer with your breath, and very gently escort your awareness and your full attention back to
your breathing.
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Let go of any thoughts of how long you have been sitting here or how many minutes
might be left in this sitting. Just simply stay with your breathing, approaching the next breath
with fresh interest and new awareness, as if it were the first breath of this sitting. Each inbreath truly a new beginning, each out-breath another opportunity to let go of what is already
over. And following your in-breath and your out-breath, one breath after the next, from
moment to moment. In a few moments, I will ask you to stop and we will continue with the
rest of the study. Please begin to return your attention to the room. When you are ready, open
your eyes. Please open the door and alert the experimenter that you are finished and prepared
to proceed.

